Behaviourism and Theological Freedom: An Exploration in Theological Anthropology by McVey, A. William
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Scholars Commons @ Laurier 
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 
1973 
Behaviourism and Theological Freedom: An Exploration in 
Theological Anthropology 
A. William McVey 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McVey, A. William, "Behaviourism and Theological Freedom: An Exploration in Theological Anthropology" 
(1973). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1551. 
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1551 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ 
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca. 
BEHAVIOURISM AND THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM: 
AN EXPLORATION IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
by 
A. WILLIAM MCVEY 
B.Th. University of Ottawa, 1968 
Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Master of Arts degree, Waterloo Lutheran 
University 
Examing Committee 
Richard Grossman, B.A., M.Div., M.A. 
"Ehomas Lawrence Dawson, B.A., M.A., Ph.D. 
Robert Warren Fisher, A.B., B.D., Ph.D. 
Delton J. Glebe, B.A., M.A., B.D., Th.D. 
Donald Frederick Morgenson, B.A., M.S., Ph.D. 
Aarne J. Siirala, Th.Cand., Th.Lic, Th.D. 
Lawrence E. Toombs, B.A., B.D., Ph.D. 
,j b (w 3 6%lro 
,_,^y 
UMI Number: EC56433 
All rights reserved 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMI EC56433 
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC. 
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest LLC. 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
PREFACE 
The following thesis has developed in a School of Religion 
and Culture. It is not written in traditional theological style, 
since it uses a culturological method. As theology it situates itself 
in the school of process empiricism. These empirical interests come 
from my reading of Bernard Lonergan, Charles Hartshorne, Alfred 
Whitehead and the ever creative discoveries of process thinkers. 
Furthermore, it is an effort in theological anthropology, which means 
theological statements come into existence when reality is perceived 
as an interaction of actual entities to actual entities continually 
in the process of creativity. 
"...an eternal object can be described only 
in terms of its potentiality for "ingression" 
into the becoming of actual entities, and...its 
analysis only discloses other eternal objects. 
It is pure potential. The term "ingression" 
refers to the particular mode in which the 
potentiality of an eternal obj ect is realized 
in a particular actual entity contributing to 
the definiteness of that actual entity. 
Alfred North Whitehead 
(i) 
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INTRODUCTION 
A CONCEPT OR FREEDOM: A SENSITIVITY FLOW - I 
Freedom is a word with which everyone immediately identifies, 
serving as a powerful semantic catalyst since everyone finds in the 
word important dimensions of meaning. The existence of freedom is 
important to every man since it is in the ethical exercise of 
freedom that human dignity abides. In this thesis I shall offer a 
certain description of freedom and try to prove that this concept 
expresses the dynamics of freedom in contemporary society. 
There are six established definitions of the word freedom: 
1) a being free; 2) political liberty, as freedom of speech; 
3) exemption from a specified obligation, discomfort, etc.; 4) a being 
able to act, use, etc., without hindrance; 5) ease of movement, 
facility; 6) frankness. Definition number five, ease of movement, 
facility, is the one I have selected as the most proper concept of 
freedom for the modern period. Definition number one refers to a 
philosophical mode; two, to a category of politics; three, to a system 
of moral or legal sanctions; four, to a biological construct; six, to 
a matter of interpersonal relations. Number five is rather elastic 
in that it refers to a sense of flow, a rhythm that passes through 
the mind, a sentient cerebral flow of impression and decisions or an 
Webster's New World Dictionary, (Toronto: Public Library), 
p.219. 
2 
inner state of abstracted reality giving to man the foundation for a non-
material spiritual sense of being. Using this definition indicates that 
freedom in this construct is seen as man's desire to move with ease 
through reality and his states of consciousness. In order to move 
with this ease it means that man desires basically not to be 
restricted by a lack of control in his consciousness, his skills, 
institutions, plans and hopes. So, from the beginning we must see 
the correlation between freedom and control. Without control there 
2 
is no freedom; only a state of non-movement, a continual acceptance 
of any type of reality that is fed to us. Freedom is the need for 
movement, control is the need to remove obstacles within ourselves 
or outer obstacles that obstruct such an ease of movement. However, 
there is a cultural need to arrive at a wider moral understanding of 
freedom and control, and it is suggested that the real change in our 
present historical period is the effort to re-think the nature of 
freedom. There is no way of predicting what a re-thinking of freedom 
Herman Hesse, Magister Ludi or The Glass Bead Game. Foreword 
by Theodore Zidkowski. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1947). 
Beyond a doubt Hesse's most difficult and metaphysical work. 
In my study of Hesse, especially this book I discovered the 
same questions of interiority and cognition that Lonergan 
treats. Hesse is especially helpful in pointing out how 
the same questions exist in the eastern mind. 
Tirich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Library 
Book, 1941), pp. 282-301. 
3 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1951) , pp. 607-609. 
3 
and control may bring. The only safe thing a person can say is the 
effort is unavoidable, and one must hope that there is within man 
and history a certain destiny, and part of this destiny must be a 
greater awareness of the dynamics of freedom. 
A SENSITIVE FLOW I 
Discovering the new dynamics of freedom has become the role 
of the ethicist. He is the one who must develop a sensitivity to 
changes of perception that history causes. The scientist has the 
responsibility of discovering the order of history, but it is the 
responsibility of the ethicist to ask basic questions in order to 
affirm or deny what is taking place within history. It is the move-
2 
ment of history that causes man to reach new horizons and insights. 
For this is the basic process in which man expresses his intellectual 
and spiritual capacities in the discovery of history and in affirming 
or denying its meaning for his present existential moment. What this 
thesis is concerned with is how does one discover and make value 
judgments on new concepts of freedom. Fundamentally, the argument 
runs through the entire thesis that it is in culture and in the 
possibilities that culture presents to the individual that freedom is 
Gibson Winter, "Human Science and Ethics in a Creative 
Society". (Paper delivered at the American Society of Christian 
Ethics, Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 616-619. 
2 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1951). 
4 
found. Working on this premise means that freedom is a cultural 
question before it becomes a systematic question. A change of insight, 
horizon, values and life-style is, therefore, first a change that 
2* 
occurs within culture. When science, religion and philosophy accept 
this as a possible starting point in their understanding of man the 
whole process used to make important statements concerning man begins 
to change. It turns into a vast inter-play of determinants, social 
functions and quests for significant meaning. When this inter-play 
is slowly put together new horizons begin to appear resulting from 
this unity between scientific perception and ethical discourse. This 
is most necessary since contemporary man is painfully facing the fact 
that he may lose control over culture, and should this happen the 
cost is his own human identity. For every man is most human when he 
feels that in some ways he controls his environment. 
Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 41-51. 
2 
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), pp. 212-145. 
*Leslie White is a strong determinist who like Skinner 
denies the freedom principle, yet much of his thought is 
to be seriously questioned, mainly his cultural investiga-
tion in the way culture has laws unto itself in the 
producing of information and social limitations. 
3 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1951), pp. 1-80. 
4 
Bernard Lonergan, Collections, papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., 
edited by F.F. Crowe, S.J. (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967). 
j?aul Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), pp. 27-28. 
5 
So I have selected the concept of freedom because I feel 
that upon it much of our theological and ethical discourse hangs. 
By culture I am referring to group patterns of behaviour, 
mores and symbols. This will be developed much more in the course 
of this paper. The ethical concern about culture is questions 
brought about by cultural change. But before asking any questions 
there are two major questions that ethical discourse must first 
resolve. One, is culture (group learning) a static thing which 
contains, as it were, a body of essential questions and answers, or 
is it a dynamic process always presenting new questions and new 
insights? Rather quickly I answer this question in the affirmative. 
Culture is not static; it evolves into continually new forms, always 
offering new questions. The argument of this paper will be that 
in seizing upon the new questions man gains freedom. The second 
question is about the evolution of culture into new forms. Is it 
the result of man giving reality meaning or does it arise independently 
of man? My answer to this is that culture is a most puzzling reality, 
and the growth and control of culture is possible if there is a 
continuing inter-play of a philosophy of determinism and an acceptance 
of man as meaning maker. Does man create culture or is he enslaved 
by it? I have rushed ahead of myself to establish attitudes towards 
freedom. This is necessary before beginning to organize a system 
Adamson E. Hoebel, "The Nature of Culture", in Harry L. Shapiro 
(ed.), Man, Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1956), pp. 168-182. 
6 
and themes on the topic that freedom is a flow; it is man's desire 
for flexibility in a world that threatens the flexibility he so dearly 
demands. 
2 
Proper ethical discourse is always dialectical. In doing 
this it attempts to do more than just ask the questions, it tries to 
resolve the questions. Being dialectical it turns ethical discourse 
into not just a process of conceptualization, but it enters into the 
3 
dynamics of problem-solving. Doing a paper in theological ethical 
discourse immediately places the freedom question into a schemata of 
freedom as a problem. 
Often the question of freedom is not treated as a problem. 
Its existence is presumed and ethics discusses its need or the use 
and misuse of freedom. However, contemporary insights forces ethics 
to come to grips with the more essential question, the whole possibility 
of freedom. Even if intuitively the existence of freedom is a good 
presumption, avoiding the more basic question is most dangerous for 
ethical discourse. The danger in avoiding the fundamental question of 
freedom as a social possibility limits the ability (and, therefore, 
the freedom) of ethics itself in responding to a large part of social 
Richard L. Means, The Ethical Imperative (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1969), pp. 71-102. 
2 
Paul Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), pp. 19-20. 
3 
Paul Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), pp. 57-75. 
7 
science, namely those branches of social science that in part or 
totally reject freedom as a valid term for understanding the nature 
of man and the dynamics of culture. Therefore, in this ethical 
construct the main concern is a new horizon on the question of 
freedom for social science and ethics. It is in dealing with the 
dynamics of the different schools of thought that surround the freedom 
, 2* 
question that will eventually cause this new horizon. 
A way of solving a problem is to jump right into it, and this 
is achieved if the problem is initially limited. There are four areas 
of scientific speculation where one can discover the problematical 
questions surrounding freedom; the four schools of thought in social 
science dealing with freedom are functionalism, determinism, behaviourism, 
and existentialism. Functional theories usually come out of the field 
of sociology, and they visualize social functioning as an inter-play 
and ordering of certain essential forms and orders tending in various 
ways to repeat themselves. The study of society and its free flow 
depends upon certain patterns which are predictable. Determinism is 
more associated with schools of social anthropology although it overlaps 
into sociology. Its intention is to discover determinants that cause 
society to evolve and explain the formation of man's identity on the 
Richard L. Means, The Ethical Imperative (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1969), pp. 237-251. 
TVIichael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper § Row, 1971), pp. 53-73. 
* This is a dialectical procedure that Nowak refers to 
as a technique of going from standpoint to standpoint, 
and so the same dialectical technique must be used if 
religion is to offer intelligent statements on the existence 
of freedom. 
8 
basis of these determinants. Behaviourism is usually found in schools 
of psychology that explain behaviour in terms of conditioning forces, 
discovered through scientific investigation. Existential theories 
are also usually associated with the field of psychology, but are 
radically different from the other three in that they emphasize the 
presence of certain qualities within man, e.g., choice, desire, 
courage to be, in order to explain behaviour. Each of these schools 
overlap into the neighbouring science, and each presents very deep 
questions on the nature of social and individual freedom. 
This is where we go to find an expression of the problem in 
theoretical form. To do justice to the question it is necessary to 
limit the problem area, and so I have limited it to a dialogue with 
the behaviourist school as I discover it represented in the thoughts 
of B.F. Skinner. Initially limiting the theme of freedom to Skinnerian 
concepts allows the problem to become much more apparent. Even though 
I am directly limiting the problem to the questions behaviourists ask, 
much of my response comes out of a dialogue and a conflict with the 
school of determinism^ I should, therefore, explain briefly my 
relationship with determinism. My acquaintance and at times use of 
determinism comes from a study and reflection upon the anthropologist 
Leslie White in his work, Science of Culture. White being a strong 
determinist finds little value in the freedom premise, for him freedom 
says next to nothing about the nature of society. Society, rather, is 
a collection of behaviour and behaviour is born out of symbols which 
9 
are the cultural media through which man learns. The only constant 
we have in any understanding of man is the human organism "0", it 
is the constant, it is the invariable and everything else shapes the 
"0".* Culture is the embodiment of symbols and behaviour is the 
product of the human organism and cultural symbols: 0 + Cs -- Behaviour. 
This is an extreme oversimplification of White, but I only present it 
at this time because there is something of the determinist in me, and 
my concepts on freedom are a result from the ethicist fighting the 
determinist. I might add for the sake of interest that White sees 
certain determinants shaping our symbols and the most basic cultural 
determinant is the harnessing of energy drive. Such a system is a 
very sophisticated development of the premise that man is fundamentally 
the toolmaker. 
But this presentation does not deal with White, rather it is 
an encounter with B.F. Skinner. He has been selected because his 
statements and propositions are clear, concise and bold, and demand a 
response from the ethicist. A confrontation is most necessary from 
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), pp. 55-76. 
*Most important to note is that White holds for symbols 
being produced out of necessity, i.e., they are completely 
the result of socio-economic determinants. Symbols are 
an effort, as it were, to catch up with a growth process 
which has already taken place. Science of Culture -- note 
particularly chapters 12, Man's Control Over Civilization, 
and Energy and the Evolution of Culture. 
2Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
10 
schools of religion since it becomes their responsibility to ask a 
whole new set of questions. The basic methodology of schools of 
religion in this type of process is to begin asking some very fundamental 
questions. At least, the ethicist Gibson Winter so defines the 
whole purpose of ethics, the asking of fundamental questions. And so 
freedom as a topic of ethical inquiry is to search out these questions 
and this begins by facing its deinal. 
If one is to understand the present scientific predicament, it 
is necessary to become somewhat familiar with the works of August Comte 
and Edmund Husserl. In the philosophical discourses of these two 
philosophers, the foundation is laid for the scientific-philosophical 
theoretical question: namely, what is a human organism? It will 
serve here to mention that present controversy in science stems from 
a philosophical positivism and a phenomenological understanding. 
Logical positivism was a great break from Western philosophical 
heritage. What it really did was to destroy any appreciation for a 
complete understanding of man and his dimensions of meaning. Positivism 
asserts that the meaning of all things is the appearance of things as 
they appear. Edmund Husserl rejects this concept and builds a 
philosophy on the limitations of man to perceive things. Jumping off 
from Descartes, "I think therefore I am", Husserl holds for radical 
doubt of all that is perceived, and creates a philosophy on the 
fundamental principles of radical doubt and monadic understanding taking 
Gibson Winter, "Human Science and Ethics in a Creative Society", 
(paper delivered at the American Society of Christian Ethics, Los Angeles, 
1971), pp. 38-48. 
11 
the "I" as the centre of the universe. Most important is how do 
I know? Although this is a philosophical battle of the abstract, it 
has taken on great importance when it is applied to the field of 
psychology which must ultimately justify itself on the basis of empirical 
and tested understanding. I hope to further illustrate that much 
of the confusion in the area of the social sciences and the science of 
behaviour (if such a distinction is necessary) has been caused by 
either a lack of a unifying base or an indifference to wider cultural 
2 
viewpoints. Such a comment is permissible if one is ready to accept 
the premise that it is impossible to have any scientific methodology 
without finding its desire for insight and intelligibility in some 
3 
preconceived concept of just what is insight and intelligibility. 
Sigmund Koch gives serious expression to this problem in an article 
"Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary", where 
he writes: 
.. .we are not known (referring to psychologists) 
for our readiness to be in the wavefront of 
history. It could almost be maintained that 
modern psychology ran out of its independence at 
the moment of declaring it. In every period of our 
%enri S.J. DeLubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, translated 
by Edith M. Riley (Cleveland and New York: Meridan Books, 1963), 
pp. 79-147. 
2 
Sigmund Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of 
Knowledge as Unitary" (paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963), 
pp. 1-7. 
3 
Bernard Lonergan, Collections, papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., 
edited by F.F. Crowe, S.J. (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), pp. 223-
228. 
12 
history, we have looked to external sources in 
the scholarly culture, especially natural 
science and the philosophy of science for our 
sense of direction. And typically we have 
embraced policies long out of date in those very 
sources. What is unique about our present 
relative to the rest of the scholarly culture is 
that each branch of the latter seems to be either 
working toward, or into existence, a redefinition 
of knowledge based on empirical analysis of inquiry 
of a sort which most largely depend on psychological 
modes of analysis.! 
Claiming the need to expand the boundaries of psychology is Koch's 
main argument against B.F. Skinner. This type of argumentation is 
one way of validly attacking Skinnerian behaviourism for it seems 
that Skinnerian behaviourism is founded on a limited goncept of the 
science of human behaviour. In my critique of Skinner, I lay emphasis 
on the fact that his type of behaviourism is of its nature incapable 
of giving full understanding to the questions of freedom, dignity and 
the design of culture. 
Escaping the Skinner box is much easier for philosophers, 
theologians and anthropologists who can develop a behavioural 
methodology that contains a greater totality in its insights and the 
intelligibility immanent in the study of the human organism. 
Psychologists, as Koch explains have a much more difficultproblem to 
handle in their confrontation with Skinner. I feel that Skinner forces 
psychology to face itself, and define more precisely its philosophy 
and methodology. 
Sigmund Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge 
as Unitary" (paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963), p.30. 
13 
PRELIMINARY SUMMARY 
Briefly, B.F. Skinner is to be handled as follows: 
1. Behaviour is a question of the totality (or wholeness) 
of human consciousness, understanding and control. 
2. A. new face for the social and behavioural sciences 
is possible. This new image promises a greater 
totality of method. And this new face will come 
from the insights growing out of a new concept of 
ethics and cognition. 
3. Psychology may not be able to solve the problem 
itself. If it does, the answer lies somewhere 
within phenomenological psychology, dynamic therapy 
and neo-neo-behaviourism. 
4. A wider constructional theology is necessary to 
answer questions regarding the nature of freedom and 
dignity. 
These four points will not be considered in any chronological order. 
They are presented here so that the reader may know immediately a 
general methodology. By giving these four points I am trying to 
illustrate how I propose to wrestle with B.F. Skinner. As these four 
points are the essence of a rebuttal, it is possible to develop a 
wider science of human behaviour by first condemning Skinner's inability 
to make distinctions, and then partially rebuilding his method into 
a more total system. I stress the word distinction because I believe 
Skinner, the "Philosopher", fails to understand that the most basic 
14 
rule in philosophy, especially a philosophy of science, is the need 
to make distinctions. Lacking this philosophical art, his philosophy 
of science remains trapped in an intellectual vacuum or better still, 
a box. It might sound at this stage of analysis as if I am very 
much opposed to behaviourism, but not so. My four methodological 
points liberate behaviourism and neo-behaviourism by opening up a 
horizon for a neo-neo-behaviourism, a piece of terminology I have 
taken from Michael Scriven. 
SKINNERIAN CONCEPT OF FREEDOM - II (A) 
As an experimental psychologist, B.F. Skinner has made a 
considerable contribution to the understanding and control of behaviour. 
But there is also the philosopher in Skinner, even though he might 
2 
vehemently deny this, and it is his application of experimental 
behaviourist principles that has caused the recent public outcry. 
Long before his present popularity, Skinner was in the thick of the 
fight with his fellow psychologists who had divided into two camps, 
the phenomenologists and the behaviourists. The whole conflict is the 
age-old controversy about what happens within that highly developed 
organism of the human brain. Psychology began with a behaviouristic 
Michael Scriven, "Views of Nature" (paper from Rice University 
Symposium, 1963). Cf. above. 
2 
B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 
Inc., 1971), pp. 145-184T 
*In chapter 8 of Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner becomes a 
topic philosopher. It is in the chapter that Skinner leaps from empirical 
findings to give 
15 
bias (as given in the teachings of its founding fathers, e.g., Pavlov, 
Thorndike and Watson). Skinner is a direct descendant of this line, 
and his career has been dedicated to the renewing and development of 
earlier behaviouristic concepts. And as a neo-behaviouristlhe has 
become a strong opponent of other schools of psychology, namely 
phenomenology and dynamic therapy. 
Any behaviourist has very set principles on which he works. 
The most basic of all behavioural principles, as is consistently seen 
in the works of B.F. Skinner, is that man, or better still, the human 
organism, "0", is a reality strongly or completely controlled by 
external variables which affect the "0" in the form of stimuli causing 
responses which cause in turn reflexive respondent behaviour. In 
symbolic form it goes S + R — 0. If behaviour is to be understood 
such knowledge does not come about by studying "0" in itself, rather 
behaviour is understood by arriving at a knowledge of the external 
variables and contingencies that condition behaviour. Understanding 
behaviour means accepting basic scientific behavioural laws as expressed 
in such key concepts as variables, invariables, stimuli, responses, 
respondent behaviour, operant behaviour and contingencies. In chart 
B.F. Skinner, "Behaviourism at Fifty", paper from Rice University 
Symposium, 1963, pp. 79-81. 
16 
form, it might be illustrated as follows: 
CHART I 
On = Organism Neutral 
S = stimuli 
R = responses 
B = behaviour 
SjR.^ S2R2, S3R3, S4R4, etc. -- On -- B,, B2, B3, B., etc. 
Behaviourism does not disclaim that there are not the internal functions 
of the "0", but it holds that these internal functions are of little 
account and are effective insofar as they might alter certain moods. 
Internal variables are restricted to the smooth muscles which cause 
certain organic functions, e.g., secretion, sweat, Salivation, hunger, 
etc., and these are not of any great importance to a science of behaviour. 
Skinner is a neo-behaviourist. And neo-behaviourism is a 
development of the earlier behaviourist discoveries in the study of 
reflexes. Neo-behaviourism accepts earlier scientific laws of reflex 
action, e.g., Pavlov's work in the area of Salivation, and explains all 
respondent behaviour on the basis of conditioning. Earlier behaviourism 
was primarily concerned with smooth functioning muscles, whereas neo-
2 
behaviourism is concerned with total functioning of striated muscles. 
B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (Toronto: Collier-
MacMillan Ltd., 1953), pp. 45-194. 
2Ibid., pp. 91-106. 
17 
Pavlov studied reflexes, whereas B.F. Skinner investigates the 
totality of operant behaviour. It is a total understanding of the 
"I" as formed by conditioning and contingencies. All behaviour is 
the result of conditioning. In such a view, the cause of behaviour 
becomes the independent variables and the ensuing effects are known 
as the dependent variables. Quite simply, behaviour is explained from 
the outside. To attempt an explanation of behaviour from something 
occurring inside man is to resort to primitive animistic and non-
scientific thinking. We have, Skinner would claim, several remaining 
examples of such thinking in our common scientific vocabulary. 
Animistic thought holds for such theories as the little inner man 
expressing himself in concepts of soul, i.e., ego, super ego, top dog 
under dog, etc. Adhering to the strict behavioural canon of parsimony 
means that to understand behaviour in terms of innate choices, purposes, 
goals and aims has little scientific validity for these are unobservable 
data and in all probability result from the little inner man theory. 
Within this restricted canon of parsimony the dialogue with 
behaviourism begins in order to establish whether B.F. Skinner's 
philosophy, as a theory of science will win, survive, renew itself or 
prove totally inadequate. Giving full respect to Skinner as a behaviourist 
B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf 
Inc., 1971), pp. 197-2017 
18 
scientist, I argue that Skinner is weak in his cultural applications 
which follow from his lack of appreciation for the total functioning 
of the cognitional structure. It is here that Skinner dogmatically 
displays his Achille's heel -- his Nothing But story. He seems to 
suggest, at least to his fellow psychologists, the cognitional structure 
is only understood in behaviourist concepts: i.e., S § R. 
THE COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE - II (B) 
Understanding the cognitional structure became a problem for 
scholars long before B.F. Skinner. Philosophy has dedicated the entire 
field of epistemology to the problem. Greek philosophers were the 
first to give full attention to the problem and two opposite schools 
came into existence, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. The concern 
in the past as in the present is how do I know? If it stopped here, 
however, philosophers would argue we are dealing with psychologisms 
and would immediately follow with a more complete question, "how do I 
know, I know".' Time and time again we see Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, 
etc. return to the problem, "how do I know" and "what is an idea?" 
Since the 1800's the greatest amount of contemporary philosophical 
development has been in epistemology, and we return to the same question 
of knowledge, "how do I know" when attempting to form a critique on 
Skinner. I suggest that we have a problem of knowledge and can observe 
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 1-22. 
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the controversy at a high contemporary level of thought in the 
psychologists Rogers, Skinner and Chomsky. 
Skinner holds that Rogers, for example, is Platonic and views 
mans as the possessor of shadows of reality within himself. The 
Platonic view is that man never sees reality, but only shadows of 
it on the wall of the cave in which he is imprisoned. Knowing is 
a camera observing. A thin pencil of light penetrates the brain and 
is photographed. 
If the retina could suddenly be developed like 
a photographic plate, (Skinner writes) it would 
yield a poor picture. The nerve impulses in 
the optic tract must have an even more tenuous 
resemblance to "what's seen'. The patterns of 
vibrations which strike our ear where we listen 
to the music are quickly lost in transmission. 
The bodily reactions to substances tasted, 
smelled, and touched would scarcely qualify as 
faithful reproductions. These are discouraging 
for those who are looking for copies of the real 
world within the body, but they are fortunate for 
psychophysiology as a whole. At some point 
the organism must do more than create duplicates. 
It must see, hear, smell, and so on, as forms of 
action rather than of reproduction. It must do 
some of the things it is differentially reinforced 
for-doing when lit learns to respond discriminatively. 
The sooner the pattern of the external world 
disappears often impinging on the organism, the 
sooner the organism may get on with these other 
functions. 
The need for something beyond and quite different 
from copying is not widely understood. Suppose 
someone were to coat the occipital lobes of the 
brain with a special photographic emulsion which, 
B.F; Skinner, "Behaviourism at Fifty", paper from Rice 
University Symposium, 1963, p».84. 
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when developed, yielded a reasonable copy of 
a current visual stimulus. In many quarters this 
would be regarded as a triumph in the physiology 
of vision. Yet nothing could be more disastrous 
for we should have to start all over again and 
ask how. 
The organism sees a picture in its occipital 
cortex and we should now have much less of the 
brain available in which to seek an answer. It 
adds nothing to an explanation of how an organism 
reacts to a stimulus to trace the pattern of the 
stimulus in the body. It is most convenient, for 
both organism and psycho-physiologist, if the 
external world is never copied if the world we 
know is simply the world around us.l 
Such words come from a scientist who in no way holds for 
Platonic thinking. Instead of calling Skinner a behaviourist we 
might call him a realist, inasmuch as knowing is understood by 
grasping the nature of the real, the real as it exists outside. 
The immediate popular and scholarly response to Skinner is 
that he studies lower organisms, i.e., pigeons. He observes in the 
lab, formulates laws and places his research into the hand of applied 
science. In reading Skinner it is most obvious that he is completely 
an experimental scientist who places much emphasis on a classical 
2 
concept of science. He might deny this, but nonetheless, it is true. 
Classical science, e.g., in physics and chemistry works on a level 
of law-to-law. Discovering the immanence of nature by discovering 
its laws is the heart of classical science. Such a view was strong 
1B.F. Skinner, "Behaviourism at Fifty", paper from Rice 
University Symposium, 1963, p. 87. 
2 
B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (Toronto: Collier-
MacMillan Ltd., 1953), pp. 3-12. 
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and was the only possibility in science until the dawn of relativity. 
Relativity introduced a more complete attitude towards science in that 
it introduced an empirical residue. This residue, the cosmos of 
exploration, is the open-ended range of frequences, velocities and 
probabilities scientists must face. Though Skinner would not deny 
this, I do get the impression he is too complacent with abstract 
law-to-law findings; lacking because of this a wider understanding of 
the relationship between abstract generality (classical law) and the 
empirical residue (laws of relativity). 
Any good criticism of Skinner has hit upon this major error. 
He is a man who does not face the totality of scientific method. Rogers, 
a dynamic therapist, challenges the S-R theorists on these grounds. 
Dynamic therapy is quite opposite to behaviourism in that it claims 
the "0" to have laws unto itself allowing the "0" to function as master 
of its own ship. A necessary condition for the prediction of the 
behaviour of an organism is the specification of its internal states. 
Such predictions demands the full attention of the sciences of neurology 
and physiology. Behaviourism becomes a shallow concept of science if 
it ignores what happens at contact and excludes the yet unknown mystery 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1951), pp. 33-63. 
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of neurons, synapses and central nervous system. 
Man is in potentiality and act a multi-dimensional creature 
who functions on several levels. In this level functioning dynamics 
the funadmental distinction is between primary and secondary levels. 
Philosophically and theologically it is permissible to accept man as 
a creature on a primary level where he responds to an environment 
of external stimuli, e.g., the little baby enjoying pleasant or 
aversive stimuli. 
However, the organism of the mind clothed in the human spirit 
is differentiated and beyond primary levels of existence. Accepting 
such a fact does not demand any blind existential leap, rather it is 
obvious if a broad methodology is used in understanding knowing, and 
knowing our knowing. One of the greatest advantages man has had in 
the exercise of the large frontal lobe of his brain is that he can 
verbalize and symbolize. The human ability to function, question and 
think establishes a presence of a secondary level. It is a secondary 
level of meaning where the cognitive drive is towards deeper and 
deeper levels of meanings. Because of the secondary cognitive level 
of meaning, man has evolved to the state of differentiated conscious-
ness. Anthropology, art, philosophy, literature and day to day 
verbal existence of man testify to the fact of a uniqueness of the 
human mind in its ability to capture insight and meaning in symbols. 
Most clearly we can understand the dynamics of this human process in 
Carl R. Rogers, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of 
Knowledge as Unitary". Paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963, 
pp. 120-126. 
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the Socratic method. Socrates teaches his students the meaning of 
secondary cognitive levels of pushing them to ask deeper and deeper 
questions about symbols they have accepted. Socrates understands 
the totality of man's cognitive nature by using the symbols of reality 
to judge, understand and bring about a better life. It is man's 
symbolic nature which gives him dignity and intellectual freedom. The 
process begins very early in life as one observes the small baby 
coming into contact with the external environment. Infancy is a time 
of primary level stimuli experience, but it not long before the child 
becomes inquisitive about the stimuli, e.g., of the hand, and becomes 
concerned about its functionality. From early primary stimuli experience, 
the child begins to formulate that most beautiful question, "what's 
that?" And here we have that most obvious drive of quid sit upon 
which all philosophy, science, art and common sense find their origin. 
Greek philosophers demanded their students define their symbols in 
omni et soli definitions, fully aware of the fact that such definitions 
would never be reached. What they did achieve, however, was to force 
their students to enter into the cognitive process of experiencing, 
2 
knowing and knowing knowing. The possession of the cognitive want 
Bernard Lonergan, Collections (paper by Bernard Lonergan, S. J., 
edited by F.F. Crowe, S.J., Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), pp. 252-
256. 
2Ibid., pp. 258-267. 
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to arrive at insights through the use of experiencing, judging and 
knowing brings one continually to new stages of self-awareness, but 
even more importantly one can understand the meaning of these stages. 
Treating this human characteristic so lightly is Skinner's 
major error as any linguist will so vehemently point out. The 
linguist attacks the Skinnerian concept of "verbal repertoire". Just 
what does it mean, if anything, to understand symbolizing, language 
and symbol making as a verbal repertoire inherited from our verbal 
community? Does the reader read David Copperfield, as Skinner would 
suggest, only to receive positive reinforcement or is it not more 
probable that the reader enters a cognitive world of meanings? 
Do I read Beyond Freedom and Dignity only to receive reinforcement, 
or do I read Beyond Freedom and Dignity in order to realize my cognitive 
nature which becomes satisfied in the discovery of insights? 
Surely if we understand our secondary level of existence even 
the word reinforcement itself opens up an area of scientific explora-
tion encompassing an incredible amount of cognitive data. Missing 
the all important distinction between stimuli and symbol limits 
behaviourism to the narrow confines of the Skinner box. As one given 
to the anthropological method, I must challenge Skinner's basic thesis 
regarding operant behaviour, for I understand much of our behaviour 
as being reinforced through the cognitive grasp of symbols. Ignoring 
B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf 
Inc., 1971), p. 112. 
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this fact will restrict the science of behaviour to the strictly 
primary level. Persuasion, choice, aim, goal only become verbal 
expressions of S-R theories. Therefore, I hold the best way to 
confront behaviourism is with the linguistic-cognitive school. Another 
method would be to support the phenamenologist who argues from a 
completely separate type of scientific clinical vision. My two 
favourite representatives of this school are Victor Frankl and 
Paul Tournier. However, it is better to look for another link which is 
the linguistic link. It is the linguistic-cognitive school that at 
least leads us to the area of symbolism, within an open residue, where 
from a school of religion a response can develop. This has to be 
done since to attempt a synthesis between the behaviourist and 
phenamenologist seems impossible, both these schools having such 
opposing fundamental views of man that any type of synthetic union is 
doomed to break down. Therefore, the best method is to look for another 
method, one that possesses a different vision and body of premises. 
It is possible if the linguists, and schools of symbolism offer another 
avenue for the understanding of behaviour. The separation between 
determinism and anti-determinism, behaviourism and phenomenology, 
freedom and non-freedom is the result of a false dichotomy which is 
the old western philosophical problem of objective-subjective. Not 
until this problem is re-interpreted is it possible to recognize the 
Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper $ Row, 1971), pp. 88-115. 
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dichotomy that runs through all of social science, theology and 
philosophy. This objective-subjective split is most obvious when 
schools of thought begin to argue whether meaning resides outside or 
within man. When objective meaning is pursued there results a quest 
for universal essences via metaphysics, that argues questions of 
being as opposed to becoming, or a quest for empiricism via empirical 
realistic universal laws. When subjective meaning is pursued there 
results a quest for anninner consciousness of the "I" as the possessor 
of all meaning. Objective schools make outer process the things of 
importance so when it is affirmed that "I perceive" it is the perceiving 
that explains the nature of man. With the subjective school, when 
it is affirmed that "I perceive" it is the "I" that becomes important. 
I suggest there is another way of knowing man's behaviour and explain-
ing inner-outer consciousness. In order to discover this we can begin 
in the area of cognition or "the process of knowing". With cognition 
we may discover a new clue to human nature, and therefore behaviour. 
In searching for clues to the meaning of human nature there are 
two techniques that can be used. One is a method of idealization 
better known as philosophical method; the other is to observe empirically, 
"trial and error", experimentation and the conclusive statements 
Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, Studies in 
Metaphysics and Religion,, Forward by William Ernest Hocking (New York: 
Hofner Publishing Company, 1953), pp69-84. 
27 
resulting from this experimental method. The knowing of man's 
cognitive flow is either conducted then in terms of idealization or 
realization. To know something about man means fundamentally to know 
how he knows, which makes it possible to say something important about 
his behaviour, how he makes decisions and how he might control his 
outer world. We might call this an ethnography of knowledge and 
habits of knowing. Not so much an ethnography of small group knowing 
but some general ethnographic statements concerning the process of 
2 
cultural knowing. An ethnography of this type lends itself to 
3 
questions about theological language. A general appreciation of the 
interaction of knowing within the restriction of reason and culture 
makes it much easier to join religion and science, in this case 
religion and behaviour. 
Looking for direction in this area help is offered by Ernst 
Cassirer and Joseph R. Royce who attempt to link religion-cognition 
and scientific cognition. It would seem that an organization of their 
theories allows the study of science, culture and theology to form 
into a greater process. 
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 6-11. 
2 
James Spradley and David W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience, 
Ethnography in Complex Society (Chicago: Science Research Association 
Inc., 1972), pp. 57-63. 
Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 53-67. 
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CULTURAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOUR - III (A) 
Before entering more deeply into theories of knowing and 
behaviour a different terminology that embodies language and symbols 
is required since the argument is that behaviour is cognition and 
cognition is symbols. To accomplish this, behaviour is explained 
always as acquired or learned behaviour which is passed on by a some 
body of symbols. When there is a sufficient amount of symbolic 
passing on we have a culture. A culture is an abstract term to express 
the sufficient presence of enough information to produce forms of 
individual and group behaviour. Just as culture and knowing can never 
be separated, the argument is just as equally justified that behaviour 
and culture are not to be separated. In other words, a culture is 
the dynamic flow of information in its symbolic form to operant 
behaviour, and the study of a culture is a study of how behaviour is 
related to this information. There is yet the further and often the 
more interesting question of what is the source of the information. 
Inversely, cognition is a process of codifying and organizing entities 
into information patterns and the style of behaviour that results. 
Therefore, it is presumed that if there is learning there must be a 
certain abstraction which exists independent of the individual or the 
group. Operant behaviour is then an adaptation to culture, and the 
first phase (enculturation) is the individual acquiring behaviour 
James Spradley and David W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience, 
Ethnography in Complex Society (Chicago: Science Research Association, 
Inc., 1972), pp. 1-20. 
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usually for purposes of maintaining the culture. Failure to appreciate 
this interplay is dangerous in that it prevents any real unity 
between empirical analysis and philosophical theological analysis. 
Finding a new clue to human nature as a source of unity would 
not only explain the dynamics of culture and behaviour, but would 
combine several different types of perceptions in contemporary culture. 
Until recently it has been impossible to achieve such a unity of 
cognition since there has been no strong epistemological base. Traditional 
forms of Western philosophy dealing with these problems have divided 
into idealism and realism. Aristotelian philosophy represents the 
realist school of thought which attempts to understand cognition, and 
man's cognitive acts, by searching for clues as they exist in nature, 
that is, for some type of cosmological expression. Opposed to such a 
view is the Platonic concept portraying human knowing in terms of 
inner reality. That is, all cognition is explained by discovering the 
shadows of reality that lie within. Socrates, again, sees cognition 
as primarily the act of inquiry, and knowing is understood as one 
2 
understands how man searches. Under these traditional categories of 
idealism, realism, and dynamic inquiry most studies of cognition in a 
Western society take place. It is quite possible that the Eastern 
pursuit is different. If this is proven, it serves to explain much 
James Spradley and David W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience, 
Ethnography in Complex Society (Chicago: Science Research Association, 
Inc., 1972), pp. 1-14. 
TBrnst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 23-26. 
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of Eastern cultural and societal development. 
Is it necessary to link these three schools into a whole? 
The answer to this question is what the cultural process is all about, 
and if we are to develop any type of strong response to behaviourism 
and determinism it is in finding a dynamic element running through 
i 
idealistic, realistic and dynamic cognition. It will have to be a 
clue that explains the operation of both culture and behaviour. 
Arriving at this clue will mean re-defining man in terms other 
than those traditional Western philosophical discourse has used. This 
re-definition has not been possible until Western culture had gone 
through several decades of empirical-scientific perception. The 
traditional definition of man attempting to unite various school is 
man as a rational animal. Starting from this definition in traditional 
epistemology, man's uniqueness is defined in terms of his rationality 
2 
and his operations of intellect and will. We see today that a 
scientific perception of man does not necessarily begin with this 
premise. For example, Skinner sees man only in scientific terminology 
as being conditioned. Even existential therapy with its bent towards 
existential philosophy does not begin with the rational premise, instead 
it is given to interpret man as having a character of universal drives 
R. Joseph Royce, The Encapsulated Man (New Jersey: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 1-10. 
Tirnst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 56-71. 
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and needs, and it is only from a confrontation with these drives 
beyond reason that man becomes truly himself. All of this presents 
real problems for schools of religion which lay so much emphasis on 
man's free attributes of intellect and will as expressions of his 
rationality. Cassirer offers the excellent suggestion that the 
division is overcome if we stop defining man in essence as being 
rational, and begin to define him on the basis of a new clue, the 
symbolic. With this outlook on human nature man becomes the symbolic 
animal as opposed to the rational animal. 
Reason is a very inadequate term with which to 
comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in 
all their richness and variety. But all these 
forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of 
defining man as animal rationale, we should 
define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing 
we can designate his specific difference, and we 
can understand the new way open to man -- the way 
to civilization.! 
MAN AS A SYMBOLIC BEING - III (B) 
If science and studies in religion are willing to understand 
man as symbolic, then a new system of cultural process arises. By 
creating this system and fully exploring the nature of symbolism a 
deeper concept of culture and behaviour is offered. Seeing man as symbolic 
opposed to reason becomes a means of avoiding epistemological 
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pv.26. 
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encapsulation, a result of the past age of enlightenment which has 
become the greatest obstacle in a sincere dialogue among all the 
disciplines interested in man. Making man a case of either/or, either 
he is rational or non-rational, leads to an encapsulation of views 
among systems, and this limited perception contributes significantly 
to destroying the freedom and dignity of man. Here, a comment on 
Skinner is apropos. Skinner seems aware of this encapsulation when 
he demands a rethinking of social science into a general science, a 
technology of behaviour but by his over emphasis on S-R theories makes 
this enterprise impossible. A method of open communication founded 
on an appreciation of man and his symbolic life is much more viable. 
When schools of religion share in this open system it turns into an 
attitude of critical realism, transcendental symbolism or process 
theology. The strength of such a system is its constant desire to 
fight against encapsulation, thereby avoiding the old pitfalls of 
realism, idealism or common sense thinking. Perhaps the description 
of freedom as a flow, presented previously, is becoming more apparent. 
The flow of freedom becomes more than a vague wish; instead, it serves 
as an axiom for the overlapping and interplay of definitions and 
R. Joseph Royce, The Encapsulated Man (New Jersey: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, 1964), pp. 129-162. 
B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 
Inc., 1971), pp. 145-183T 
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systems. The pivotal point to this, however, is the symbolic. 
The Dynamics of Symbolism 
A symbol is any event, happening, perception or occasion to 
2 
which man gives meaning. The stimuli is a physiological organic 
process, whereas the symbol is a meaning-making process. A car, for 
example, is a stimulus that causes various responses. The response 
will depend on various things -- the car's position, locomotion, when 
it is given, how it is given, etc. More broadly the car is a reality 
of several dimensions of meaning. For some it symbolizes power, for 
some danger and others a simple means of transportation. The father 
who owns the car has several different responses to the car than the 
son who has just received his license and is driving the car for the 
first time. More than being a stimulus the car conveys, through 
symbolic presence, meaning. Nowhere, as with language, do we encounter 
the significance of symbols, so much so that a whole new philosophical 
system of linguistics has come forth. Words are in culture more than 
just phonetic stimuli. They are symbols containing depth of meaning; 
one strata of meaning in the words themselves and several others when 
3 
they are put into use. It is in the symbolic that man is given his 
R. Joseph Royce, The Encapsulated Man (New Jersey: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, 1964), pp. 165-183. 
2 
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), pp. 25-26. 
"TErnst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 26-30. 
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potential for being human. The best example of the symbolic process 
producing human ability is the story of Helen Keller, and in the story 
of Helen as recorded by her teacher, Mrs. Sullivan, we get a good 
illustration of the general problem. 
I must write you a line this morning because 
something very important has happened. Helen 
has taken the second great step in her education. 
She has learned that everything has a name and 
the manual alphabet is the key to everything she 
wants to know. 
This morning while she was washing, she wanted 
to know the name for "water". When she wants to 
know the name of anything, she points to it and pats 
my hand. I spelled "w-a-t-e-r" and thought no more 
about it until after breakfast... [Later on] we went 
to the pump house, and I let Helen hold her mug 
under the spout while I pumped. As the cold water 
gushed forth filling her mug, I spelled "w-a-t-e-r" 
in Helen's free hand. The word coming so close 
upon the sensation of cold water rushing over her 
hand seemed to startle her. She dropped the mug 
and stood as one transfixed. A new light came into 
her face. She spelled "water" several times. Then 
she dropped on the ground and asked for its name 
and pointed to the pump and the trellis and suddenly 
turning around she asked for my name. I spelled 
"teacher". All the way back to the house she was 
highly excited, and learned the name of every object 
she touched, so that in a few hours she had added 
thirty new words to her vocabulary. The next 
morning she got up like a radiant fairy. 
She flitted from object to object, asking the name 
of everything and kissing me for very gladness. 
.. .Everything must have a name now. Wherever we 
go, she asks eagerly for the names of things she 
has not learned at home. She is anxious for her 
friends to spell, and is eager to teach the letters 
to everyone she meets. She drops the signs and 
pantomimes she used before, as soon as she has 
words to supply their place, and the acquirement of 
a new word affords her the liveliest pleasure. And 
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we notice,that her face grows more expressive 
each day. 
The argument in symbol analysis is that the mind is not 
passive, rather it is a receptor-effector system. It perceives 
because it experiences a continued amount of symbolic input. Contrary 
to straight behaviourism students of the cultural process see the 
symbolic input as the important element in the shaping of behaviour. 
Symbolic information is retained and retained for definite purposes. 
Because of this the ego (I) is in a continual flow of abstraction. Not 
only does the individual ego abstract but there is a continual 
collective cultural minding that takes place. The presence of symbols 
causes the mind to be in a state of minding, and so we might refer 
to the ego (I) as a minding information reception process. This means 
that the "I" is always relative to a culture which makes certain 
2 
symbols available - - 0 + C -- OB. 
This type of process depends on the operation both of an inner 
faculty memory and an outer operation of symbolism, both operations 
functioning in a constant interchange and thereby conditioning each 
other. Symbols when placed within this type of cultural process have 
three areas of scientific interest: the physiological, operant 
behaviour, and symbolic information in-put out-put. Physiology is 
Ernest Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale university 
Press, 1944), p. 34. 
2 
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), p. 161. 
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used here in a very wide sense of a molecular study of the brain. 
A molecular study of the brain is a serious attempt to deal with the 
brain in terms of a genetic code and what this has to relate to the 
topic of behaviour. Little so far has been done in this area, 
however early considerations offer interesting findings for the 
cultural process school, as opposed to schools of straight behaviourism 
and determinism. Studies in physiology and psycho-chemistry bring 
about a better awareness of memory retention, and symbolic human 
organization and codification. In a way it is an endeavour to use 
the computer as a model to understand human brain functioning. 
Etheralization of reality becomes a process of one's memory bank 
stimulated by outer material and inner codification. An in-depth 
presentation of the physiology of symbolization and retention is not 
1 
necessary in this paper. However, to add to the construct of the 
theory of cultural process, I have added a few thoughts from the 
biochemist Isaac Asimov who touches upon the future question in his 
book, The Human Brain. These are vague speculations in an, as yet, 
open field of inquiry, genetics and behaviour. 
A MOLECULAR VIEW OF BEHAVIOUR - III (C) 
(a) The region about the auditory area in the temporal 
lobe is the auditory association area. There, particular 
sounds are associated with physical phenomena in the 
light of past experiences. 
(b) There is also a visual association area in the 
occipital lobe surrounding the actual visual area, and 
a samesthetic association area behind the somesthetic 
Isaac Asimov, The Human Brain, Its Capacities and Functions 
(New York: Signet Classics, 1963) pp. 318-321. 
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area. The different sensory association areas co-
ordinate their functioning in a portion of the brain 
in the neighbourhood of the beginning of the lateral 
sulcus in the left cerebral hemisphere. In this area, 
the auditory, visual and somesthetic association area, 
all come together. This overall area is sometimes 
called the gnostic area. The overall associations are 
fed into the area lying immediately in front ideomotor 
area, which translates them into an appropriate response. 
This information is shunted into the premotor area 
(lying just before the motor area in the frontal lobe), 
which co-ordinates the muscular activity being finally 
brought about by the motor area. 
(c) There is the area of the frontal lobe that lies 
before the motor and premotor areas and is, therefore, 
called the prefrontal lobe. Its lack of obvious 
function is such that it is sometimes called the "silent 
area". 
There might be a tendency, rather to consider it of 
all sections of the brain, the most significant. In 
general, the revolutionary trend in the development 
of the human nervous system has been the piling of 
complication upon complication at the forward end of 
the nerve cord. In passing from the primitive chordates, 
such as emphioxus, into the vertebrate subphylum, one 
passes from unspecialized nerve cord to one in which the 
anterior end has developed into the brain. Also, in 
passing up the classes of vertebrates from fish to 
mammals, it is the forebrain section of the brain that 
undergoes major development, and the cerebrum becomes 
dominant. In going from insectivores to primates and 
within the primate order, from monkey to man, there 
has been a successive development of the foremost section 
of the cerebrum frontal lobe. 
In the early hominids even after the brain had achieved 
full human size, the frontal lobes continued development. 
Neanderthal man had a brain as large as our own, but 
the frontal lobe of the brain of tree man gained at the 
expense of the occipital lobe, so if the total weight 
is the same, the distribution of weight is not. It is 
easy to assume then that the prefrontal lobes, far from 
being unused, is a kind of very epitome of the brain. 
(d) Even granted that the behaviourist stand is correct 
in principle and that all human behaviour, however 
complex, can be brought down to a mechanical pattern of 
nerve cells (and hormones) the further question arises " 
as to whether it is useful to allow matters to rest there. 
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Clearly we have much further to go than the distance 
the pat phrase "trial and error" or "conditioning" 
can carry us. Briefly, as a change progresses there 
can come a point (sometimes quite a sharp one) where 
the outlook must change, where a difference in degree 
suddenly becomes the equivalent of a difference in 
kind. To take an analogy in the world of the physical 
sciences, let us consider ice. Its structure is pretty 
well understood on the molecular level. If ice is heated 
the molecules vibrate more and more until at a certain 
temperature the vibrations are energetic enough to 
overcome the intermolecular attractions? The molecules 
then lose their order and become randomly distributed, 
in a fashion, moreover, that changes randomly with time. 
There has been a "phase change", the ice has melted and 
becomes water. The molecules in liquid water are like 
the molecules in ice and it is possible to work out 
a set of rules that will hold for the behaviour of those 
molecules in both ice and water. The phase change is so 
sharp, however, as to make it more useful to describe 
ice and water in different terms, to think of water in 
connection with other liquids and. ice in connection 
with other solids. 
Similarly, when the process of etheralized trial-and-error 
becomes as complicated as it is in the human mind, it may 
well be no longer useful to interpret mental activity 
in behaviourist terms. As to what form of interpretation 
is most useful that is not yet settled. 
(e) The point is, one might reasonable suppose, that 
at which reason becomes complex enough to allow abstraction; 
when it allows the establishment of symbols to stand for 
concepts, which in turn stand for collections of things 
or actions or qualities. The sound "table" represents 
not merely this table and that table, but a concept of 
"all table-like objects", a concept that does not exist 
physically. The sound "table" is thus an abstraction 
of an abstraction. 
Once it is possible to conceive an abstraction and represent 
it by a sound, communication becomes possible at a level 
of complexity and meaningfulness far beyond that possible 
otherwise. As the motor areas of the brain develop to 
the point, where a special center exists, enough different 
sounds can be made, easily and surely, to supply each of 
a vast number of concepts with individual sounds. And 
there is enough room for memory units in a brain of such 
complexity to keep all necessary association of sound 
and concept firmly in mind. It is speech then, rather 
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than reason alone that is the phase change, and that 
fixes the gulf between man and non-man. The existence 
of speech means that the gathering of experience and 
drawing conclusions is no longer a function of the 
individual alone. Experience is shared and the tribe 
becomes wiser and more knowledgeable than any individual 
in it. 
(f) More and more it is becoming fashionable to look 
upon the brain as though it were in some way an 
immensely complicated computer made up of extremely 
small switches, the neurons. And in one respect at 
least, that involving the question of memory, bio-
chemists are coming to look to structures finer than 
the neuron, and to penetrate to the molecular level. 
In a computer, a memory can be set up by making 
suitable changes in the magnetic properties of a tape, 
changes that are retained until called in to use. 
Is there an analogous situation in the brain? Suspicion 
is currently following upon ribonucleic acid (usually 
abbreviated RNA) in which the nerve cell, surprisingly 
enough, is richer than almost any other type of cell in 
the body. I say surprisingly because RNA is involved 
in the synthesis of protein and is therefore usually 
found in those tissues producing large quantities of 
protein either because they are actively growing or 
because they are producing copious quantities of protein-
rich secretions. The nerve cell falls into neither 
classification, so the abundance of RNA within it 
serves as legitimate ground for speculation. 
The RNA molecule is an extremely large one, consisting 
of hundreds or even thousands of subunits of four 
different kinds. The possible number of different 
arrangements of these subunits in the RNA molecule 
is astronomically immense. Each different arrangement 
produces a distinct RNA molecule, one capable of bringing 
about the synthesis of a distinct protein molecule. 1 
This rather lengthy quote from Asimov has been selected merely 
to establish that science is still at a very early stage in its study 
of behaviour and knowing. Often such insights from other areas of 
Isaac Asimov, The Human Brain, Its Capacities and Functions 
(New York: Signet Classics, 1963), pp. 326-327 and 338-339. 
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science are too easily overlooked by behaviourists, because of this 
they are guilty of possessing a far too limited canon of investigation. 
Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science has most adequately, as 
has Asimov, treated this most crucial question, although Winch is 
much more concerned about the establishment of sociological laws and 
the determinants of moral behaviour. The point is, however, that 
science is developing a whole new attitude to cause and effect. No 
longer does science really think in straight cause-effect concepts. 
Cause-effect relationships meaning there is always a necessary causal 
relationship between cause A and effect B. The effect is always 
traceable to some elements or operation of A; given that B happens A 
is the explanation. 
Cause-effect mentality changes when there is a more profound 
appreciation of the relativity of all investigation and experimentation. 
With this awareness there is a deeper method of giving A --> B 
explanations. They become only a general expression of probabilities 
since there is always the series of interplays. A series of inter-
actions in cause and effect laws means that B as a result or effect is 
known in terms of Al, A2, A3, A4 causing B, but the listing of all 
variables in causation or as Asimov says "Phase Change" can become so 
great that a term other than A is to be discovered. Winch put it in 
other words: when questioning cause-effect laws in social or behavioural 
studies, the major error is to think in terms of nothing more than a 
change of degree. If laws explain the physical universe then laws 
founded on a similar methodology will explain behaviour; it is only a 
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question of degree. Of course, this argument was solved long before 
Skinner in the debate between the philosophers Hume and Mill. Mill 
seized upon the major error, to say that it is just a matter of degree 
between physical operation and experimentation and behavioural studies, 
is to try to sneak by with a horrendous intellectual error. It is like 
saying that if I cut down a tree and there is a certain response, this 
response is similar to cutting off an arm, it is just a question of 
degree. 
This suggests in terms of behaviour that to know operant 
behaviour demands more than an outdated Hume, Augustus Comte, Aquinas 
type of cause-effect science or moral philosophy. A system that deals 
with the complexity of middle terms and the great question of relativity 
in behaviour is required. This system is found in symbol analysis, 
cognition, information reception and behaviour. A wider system of this 
type avoids the danger of taking a law discovered in a limited lab. set-
up, e.g., a pigeon box, with a limited frontal lobe to explain the 
totality of operant behaviour. 
SCIENCE AS A TIME-SPACE PROCESS - III (D) 
A wider frame of study which seeks to study behaviour within a 
context of culture must necessarily, as does all science, function on 
an understanding of space and time. It is only when space-time are 
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, and Its Relation 
to Philosophy, edited by R.F. Holland (London: Humanities Press, 1958) 
pp. 67-95 
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taken as axiomatic does science make any valid statements on any 
scientific level, and this applies equally to cultural and behavioural 
studies. It is the time-space element that finally eliminates the 
old cause-effect philosophical scientific outlook. Even more than 
doing this, a proper appreciation for the time-space question gives 
an order to any scientific statements. A time and space element in 
cultural studies becomes a time-space continuum which allows for 
methodical investigation in culture and the behaviour it produces. To 
achieve this continuum in a cultural process system time and space, 
as with all science, are joined into a time-space unity, and link 
together to form a temporal-formal relationship, relativity. History, 
as an example, takes place in time, but to interpret history it depends 
on how one organizes a time-space dimension. Should history be seen 
as just one event after another, we have a strictly time concept of 
history. This perception sees Lincoln as an historical figure dying 
once or the Napoleonic wars as having taken place, and never is it 
possible to repeat such events. A time-space concept of history inter-
prets historical events and acts as occurring in a particular time-
space model which serves as a model or a sample space. From this 
perception cyclical statements are made, meaning that when a similar 
space occurs the time element will be somewhat similar. There is the 
prophetic or eschatological time-space view of history, usually found 
in schools of religion, where history becomes the effort to transcend 
the time-space categories either by a unique intervention into time or 
a time-space movement as having a definite destiny. A great deal of 
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similarity exists between this religion-perception of history and 
ideological types of perception, e.g., Marxist historical conscious-
ness. Finally, still with the example of history a new perception can 
be established, a processs analysis of time-space. Time and space in 
a process view is no longer a matter of time alone (brute history) 
or time + space (cyclic history), it is time muliplied by space. 
(T x S -- events). History results from the product of time and space, 
it is a continual interplay of variables wherein the variables increase 
or decrease continually in intensity, and may or may not blend together 
at particular spots within the time-space continuum. 
The example of history has been selected only to give an 
impression of a time-space continuum. Such an axiom is essential to 
the overall picture of a cultural process, since the study of culture 
and cultural behaviour is always relative to an evolution of realities 
that happens in time-space relations. And this relativity of culture 
and behaviour is called a temporal-formal relationship. This is a 
basic axiom we can start off with in the study of behaviour -- conscious-
ness in a continual interaction of inner and outer space happening in a 
temporal-formal relationship. From this it is concluded that all systems 
interested in cultural behaviour share this common respect for the 
question of relativity when offering statements about the nature of man. 
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization (New York: Grove Press, 1949), pp. 7-21. 
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Again one wonders if Skinner who prides himself on being scientific 
has really considered such a position. For what Skinner is really 
speaking about is cultural behaviour. He never directly says this, 
but all of his findings only make sense when they are studied in the 
cultural environment of Walden II. This being the case it necessitates 
that his S-R theories be qualified by other considerations that are 
involved in a science of culture. 
ETHNOLOGY OF CULTURE AND BEHAVIOUR - IV (A) 
Initially we enter this construct of cultural process with 
language. The uniqueness of man, and his behaviour, is the symbolic, 
but the symbolic begins in culture and individual ego with language. 
It is only when the homo sapiens enters the stage of propositional 
language as opposed to animal type phonetics that we sense his unique-
ness. Chronologically man is the builder or tool maker responder, but 
to explain human uniqueness in terms of homo faber (tool maker) or 
responder is too narrow, since such an explanation presses toward the 
broader capacity of memory. Memory is the attribute that allows man 
to retain tools and responses for definite purposes, and with this 
exercise of memory, he, of course, retains sounds. So in a psychological 
or culturological study we must start with language. Culture, in 
Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, translated by Susanne K. 
Langes (New York: Dover Publishers, Inc., 1946), pp. 6-16. 
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many ways, is really no more than the passage of language. Man in the 
use of symbolic language begins to control environment. It must be 
carefully pointed out here that the term language should not, as is 
often done in schools of linguistic analysis, refer merely to syntax, 
grammar and sound. Language can also refer to the several layers of 
non-verbal communication that is part and parcel of cultural expression; 
then language is expanded to include both body and emotive language. 
Because of this, research done in Extra Sensory Perception is of vital 
importance. All these forms of language provide man with his symbolic 
behaviour, and the purpose of such behaviour is obviously to express 
dimensions of meaning. Outer space is the stuff of which he makes this 
meaning, therefore, outer space is more than a source of motor or 
emotive stimulation. It is a presence to be grasped in symbols. The 
first step in this symbolization process is language. From here the 
cultural process moves into a sequential order of development, namely 
2 
myth, art, history and science. This sequential order is the order 
selected in Cassirer's analysis of culture. In developing my construct 
I shall interpret the basic cultural process as development of symbols, 
but with always a return to the centre, the myth which provides a better 
way of interpreting how man forms meaning in a temporal-formal process. 
James Spradley and David W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience, 
Ethnography in Complex Society (Chicago: Science Research Association, 
Inc.,1972), p^.10. 
trnsttCassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 222-228. 
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Language is of its nature a complicated gift. Though it is the 
heart of cultural growth, it likewise serves as a great source of 
ambiguity in any given culture, since language is logical and rational 
while simultaneously being the ground for illusion, fallacy and 
incompleteness. The logic of language is in its general names; however, 
in application to concrete situations it becomes ambiguous. Language 
is of its nature ambiguous since it contains several dimensions of 
meaning and often many of the dimensions of meaning are beyond even the 
symbolic configuration of language, e.g., schools of linguistic 
philosophy are established on this ambiguity principle, though they 
tend to push the principle to the point of the absurd. Spencer, aware 
of the ambiguity of language, described human speech of its essence as 
metaphorical, filled with similes and analogies. Having such an 
ambiguous and metaphorical form of symbolism is the root of all other 
forms of cultural cognition, for language has potentially a multi-form 
function. A culture is never comprehended only through linguistic 
analysis, a futile effort, instead it is known if language is seen as 
the potential for more complicated forms of consciousness, namely the 
mythical. Myth is always the product of the temporal-formal evolution 
of language and behaviour in the cultural process. Before developing 
Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, translated by Susanne K. 
Langes (New York: Dover Publishers, Inc., 1946) pp. 1-23. 
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our thought in this area one other dimension should be mentioned. 
If this is not done the false impression may be given that language 
and communication theories are being used completely to explain culture 
and behaviour. 
Language and communication theories by themselves give a partial 
explanation of culture, since there is considerable evidence of more 
than a communication drive in man. This evidence is most obvious in 
man's emotional drives which are a combination of fundamental tendencies, 
appetites, needs, desires, alongside language. Any elementary study 
of primate behaviour, or any animal studies, for that matter, easily 
establishes the presence of such drives. Desmond Morris, in The Naked 
Ape, does a beautiful popular job on the whole topic when he presents 
interesting non-verbal drives and appetites, what we might call the will 
to power or domination within the group. And so another level of 
consciousness is added to the cultural process, the subconscious. This 
gives six different cognitive operations that are means of organizing 
outer reality, namely to: language, myth, art, history, science and 
the subconscious (or unconscious). As I proceed these forms are combined 
into the mythical. It is the myth that serves as the centre and the 
other modes as the peripheral, that is, in culture. These six do over-
lap (on this theological freedom hangs), and each contain within them-
Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (Toronto: Bantam Books of 
Canada, Ltd., 1967), pp. 9-12. 
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selves individual symbol-making operations. In this paper there is 
not that much attention given to the elements of the emotional drive, 
to do this would demand a whole different avenue of investigation. 
A complete view of the cultural process would demand that 
full attention be given to these six forms of consciousness. The 
only one to date who has attempted this is Ernst Cassirer, in his 
Essay on Man and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. My intention is 
not to develop such a philosophy or theology of culture, but only to 
show that these are theories of perception other than straight 
behaviourism or determinism. 
A SYSTEM OF CULTURAL PROCESS MYTH - IV (B) 
Based on the systematics of Langdon Gilkey the final block 
is in order to organize an open-ended cultural process system. It 
is a matter of taking seriously mythical consciousness, and 
seeing it as central to the cultural meaning-making activity of man. 
Language and the emotional drive exist within man, but most important 
Geza Roheim, The Origin and Function of Culture (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), Introduction, pp. v-vi. 
Should one wish to study the emotional drives under process 
theories a basic work is Freud's "Totem and Taboos" (Freud, 
1938) and the theories of the neo-Freudian Geza Roheim who 
is trying to situate Freudian principles into cultural studies 
in his work, The Origin and Function of Culture. As a neo-
Freudian, Roheim is not concerned with temporal-formal state-
ments, as much as he is with basic laws and determinants, but 
his efforts may lead to promising results in the study of 
basic emotional drives within cultures. Another important 
consideration is the whole topic of the collective unconscious 
as established by Jung; this theory should be of great interest 
to schools of religion who are into the study of culture. 
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they are a group, tribal or societal function. Taking seriously these 
movements within culture it produces a complete definition of man as 
meaning maker, meaning here being understood in the sense of purpose, 
order and explanation. Along with Victor Frankl, and his school of 
logo therapy, I interpret man fundamentally in search of meaning; 
however, he goes about this meaning-making with a certain structural 
order, the structure being the elements, information and skill his 
culture makes accessible. Rather than explaining symbolic man, as does 
Max Muller, in terms of the ambiguity of language, or Spencer in terms 
of language being metaphorical, or Freud and Jung in terms of unconscious 
drives or in terms of conditioning as does Skinner, I choose to explain symbolic 
man in terms of cultural formation. Thus man grows because of the 
2 
total operation of certain processes, primarily language + unconscious 
drive + the need for meaning, and these are the constants and operations 
upon which a culture is founded. (Lang + uncon Drive + Need for meaning 
-- Culture). Therefore, it is an involvement in these processes that 
produces behaviour. 
victor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Washington 
Square Press, 1959), pp. IV-XV. 
TErnst Cassirer, Language and Myth, translated by Susanne K. 
Langes (New York: Dover Publishers, Inc., 1946), pp. 2-4. 
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Putting all these three together we can say that a person 
always becomes part of a story. From a culture (group, tribal or 
societal), the individual begins to share in a story, and the story 
is the myth. Always distrustful of definitions it is better to first 
give a general description of myth. 
Myth is central to culture since it is the category we must 
return to if we are to know how man knows, and how, in cognition and 
feeling, he adapts and changes with his environment. Man is of his 
nature mythical, and his search for meaning is an interaction between 
being mythologized and demythologized. Myth as a significant category 
of the cultural process has not been able until rather recently to gain 
for itself a proper academic or popular image. Instead myths have 
been seen as part of a dark and primitive past when man was supposedly 
very childlike in his primitive consciousness. Philosophers have had 
mixed opinions about myths. Aristotle saw myths as metaphysical state-
ments; for Plato, allegorical expressions of natural philosophy; the 
Church fathers maintained that myth is what is believed always, every-
where, by everybody. Most uncomplimentary of all have been certain 
rationalistic philosophers who out of necessity under-estimate myth, 
since it ran contrary to the spirit of the age of Enlightenment. Tylor 
spoke of myth as belonging to an age of insanity. Spencer felt that 
TMichael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 43-87. 
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the savage was neither rational nor conscious; there is no such thing 
as primitive philosophy since they merely accept the obvious without 
questioning. Most striking in his condemnation is Voltaire who calls 
them the works of "charlatans". A few of the Romantic philosophers 
were condescending towards myth. Vico felt that they gave a figurative 
meaning to life, the German Romantic Johann Gottfried Herder called for 
a synthesis between the philosopher and the poet, but here even the 
Romantics only accepted myth as part of a poetic endeavour to conceptualize 
an existential relationship with reality. 
In my use of myth there is a heavy bias towards a sociological 
approach which interprets mythical consciousness as a means of explain-
ing the paradoxes of social order within the chaos of the universe. 
This is primarily a functionalist interpretation. To situate myth with-
in a process system, that of meaning-making, it is necessary, as does 
Cassirer, to associate it with language or a development of language 
in a meaning system. From this it follows that all forms of cultural 
communication eventually result in myths. Langdon Gilkey is even more 
helpful here, and the following theory of myth in culture is a combina-
tion of both Gilkey's and Cassirer's theories, which I shall call the 
process school of myth and culture. It will be this theoretical 
school that will be used in the conclusive analysis of the behaviourist 
school via B.F. Skinner. 
Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Foreword by Charles 
Hendel (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 4-15. 
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Myth in this construct is a form of language that grows from 
man's symbolic meaning process, whose symbols are multivalent and 
whose referent in some strange way is the transcendent or the sacred. 
And it is the appropriate mode of religious discourse, thereby 
interpreting religion as a necessary and functional part of any cultural 
process, i.e., religion as a reality or category for the purpose of 
cultural integration. From this definition three theses follow. 
(1) In a secular technological mood, technological man and culture is 
such that in its eyes myth is inappropriate and unintelligible. 
(2) Mythical symbolic thought and language is necessary for the life of 
any culture. Therefore, we, in technological society, produce our 
myths under the table, but in a distorted and self-contradictory form. 
(3) Religion is so familiar with mythology that it should provide the 
best means for understanding the nature, function, need and caution to 
be exercised with a mythical consciousness. 
The above description and outline argues that contemporary 
forms of cultural cognition have not taken myth seriously, as we shall 
see later with Skinner. As mentioned above, various scholars have 
tended to treat mythology as something of the past or as a form of 
poetic expression. However, myth is perhaps best treated as a necessary 
cultural form causing a particular type of societal interaction and 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities o 
Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of 
Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 283-284. 
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policy making. To appreciate the significance of myth, common effort 
of a science of culture, behaviour and religion is pressing. Achieving 
this will take it out of a pure functional construct, and give it the 
much broader scope of society searching for new forms of motivation 
through which culture makes or intuits new types of metaphysical 
(universal-abstracted) statements. In contemporary schools of Religion 
there have been two recent systems presented that make myth a more 
accessible category for theology. The first is Bultmann who introduced 
the question. But his treatment is insufficient since he believed 
that it is possible for theology to escape myth; he did not really see 
it as a necessary cultural form and fell into the myth of psychologism. 
It is with Langdon Gilkey that a system comes into being that allows 
for a deeper treatment of the topic, for Gilkey places theology into 
the cultural meaning-making process. And theology comes into being to 
the extent that culture seeks meaning. Schools of Religion can now 
take myth as a constant within culture, its functionality is understood 
and it serves as a source of scientific and theological intuition. This 
treatment of myth can begin by dividing myth (and the mythical conscious-
ness) into two basic categories: archaic and pejorative myths, and for 
Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958),pp. 11-23. 
54 
purposes of greater clarity divide archaic into primitive and classical 
mythology. Pejorative myth refers to the myth-making process of 
contemporary society, and this is referred to as techno-myths. 
Myth and Its Meaning-Making Process 
The most inclusive way of describing the social function of 
myth is to state that it gives to a culture its sense of the sacred. 
The word sacred is interpreted by Novak as an adherence to whatever a 
culture finds to be awe-inspiring, and provides the individual with 
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universal meaning. Whatever is taken as the sacred provides explana-
tion for the enigmas of life, and also gives models for man's social 
and personal existence. Looking for symbols that are awe-inspiring 
results in a myth structure that is multivalent in that while referring 
to the finite (given-reality), they act in culture as unconditional 
statements, thereby becoming the sacred. Each culture and civilization 
in its temporal-formal existence develops its own idea of the sacred 
and its grasp of the sacred is its myths. Western civilization has 
evolved through three distinct phases of myth-making, the archaic, 
the classical-religio period and the contemporary period of technological 
myth-making. Each of these periods has its own separate process and 
means of referrent towards the sacred, i.e., the sacred as social 
3 
necessity brings it into existence. 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of 
Twentieth-Century Theology" (paper delivered at University of Toronto 
Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 291-292. 
mchael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 28-42. 
3 
Langdon Gilkey, op. cit., p. 300. 
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Archaic myth is the product of primitive man or as Henri Frankfort 
describes him, man "Before Philosophy". Primitive man is quite 
different in his concept of time and space in that his cultural 
perception of time-space is the concrete, and his symbol process is 
not an effort to form pure abstractions, rather they are a blunt 
corporeal type of symbolism. For the primitive, space is an occasion 
of experiencing, and with an undifferentiated consciousness he perceives 
sense phenomena. Reality is a place of contact rather than a space 
for abstraction. It is a fundamental trait in archaic mythical 
thinking that wherever it posits a relationship between two members, 
it forms this relationship into a concrete identity. An attempted 
synthesis leads here necessarily to a coincidence, an immediate 
concrescence of the elements that were to be linked. Having an 
undifferentiated consciousness is not to say that primitive man is 
illogical or possesses a childlike imagination, instead he has a logic 
of his own which serves in a highly personal way to symbolize space 
and time. The world is perceived as a world of emotional encounter 
that causes joy, fear, grief and elation. Consequently, the world is 
a place that is encountered, not one of abstraction and theories. 
A close modern day analogy would be the musical "Hair" which expresses 
this concrete emotional feel for life. Much of the modern day ecological 
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. 3 
of The Phenomenology of Knowledge, translated by Ralph Manheim, with 
an introductory note by Charles W. Hendel (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1957), pp. 58-91. 
56 
concern in a similar fashion expresses this earlier type of logic. 
It is a consciousness that produces concrete symbolic configurations 
whose purpose is to form a unity with reality. Therefore, with 
the finite primitive man finds cause for the transcendent, his sacred, 
and any explanation of the finite must somehow resemble that which 
is given in experience. Because myths are an extension of cultural 
forms of cognition, when the primitive myth process creates symbolic 
meaning it is of an earthly or anthropomorphic nature. For example, 
within stories that explain his social order the gods are depicted in 
term of kinship. 
A distinction may be made between archaic and classical myth 
because I feel that within archaic myths there is present a potential 
for a different type of cultural story-making, and within this potential 
the primitive process leads to a new type of myth (cultural story) 
making, the religious. When primitive culture reaches a certain 
level of organization, known as civilization, it searches for new 
horizons in its moral awareness. It begins to seek out abstract 
principles beyond concrete body experience. Babylonian culture shows 
signs early in its cultural process of a different symbolic awareness 
in its interest in astronomy and algebraic symbols. This in turn 
produced a new type of encounter with reality. Increasing its mastery 
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy 
of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944), 
pp. 72-108. 
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of outer-space caused the culture to go beyond a strictly physiognomic 
cognition. This was most clearly obvious when it changed its mythical 
discourse, and created more ultimate ethical dimensions. As a 
consequence, the culture began to design itself around moral symbols. 
In Greek mythology there is a decline in the importance of the gods. 
Homer and Hesiod, and Herodotus and Anaxagoras become the symbols of 
a different type of mythology, stressing certain moral standards for 
purposes of a work ethic. Zeus, rather than being a god who holds sway 
over nature, becomes a god who demands a search for moral standards. 
Myth ceased being just an awe-inspiring transcendent compulsion, and 
became a conscious search for a moral will. Zoroaster's religion 
looks for the "supreme being", the "Ahura Mazdah", the wise lord. 
The divine was no longer sought only in analogical rites, but in the 
triad of good thoughts, good works and good deeds. Higher forms of 
mythmaking attempt to depart from the strictly taboo principle and 
define uncleanness in terms of more than mere physical contact, instead 
it defines personal uncleanness in terms of inner will and volition. 
Semitic myth-making rules of holiness and uncleanness are indistinguish-
able in their origin, eventually semtic myths reach the point of 
discovery that the impurity which counts is that which is written on 
the heart; it is not what enters a person that counts, but that which 
comes out. The point of this is that it is valid to make a distinction 
between primitive myth and classical religious myth, and such a 
distinction is needed because religious consciousness introduces a 
different type of abstraction process. It handles space and time with 
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unique ethical language containing a different horizon in its concern 
for first principles and a self-subsistent comprehensible first 
cause. 
Every culture must have within it a certain sense of social 
praxis. The social praxis of a culture or civilization is the method 
by which nature is controlled and ordered to the demands of human 
expression. Both ancient myth and religio-myths share a common social 
2 
praxis. Social change and order is achieved in the acting out of the 
ritual, and the ritual is the hand maid of the myth. Myth provides 
the explanation, the ritual is the enterprise whereby the culture 
exercises its freedom. This is so since the acting out of the ritual 
is an attempt to control the social holocaust and the enigmas of life. 
A very clear example of this is the Biblical account of creation. 
Genesis chapters 1 and 2 explain the present chaos of history and man's 
existential reality by returning it to cosmic origins. Evil has 
resulted because man has violated the original order. What the ritual 
is always attempting to do is please the deity so that order may be 
restored. 
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a 
Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 99-102. 
2 
Gibson Winter, "Human Science and Ethics in a Creative Society" 
(delivered at the American Society of Christian Ethics, Los Angeles, 
1971) p. 10. 
3 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of 
Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of 
Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), p. 287. 
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TECHNO-MYTHS AND BEHAVIOUR - IV (C) 
Obviously, a technological culture discovers increasingly 
little purpose in such a cultural process. Mainly, contemporary 
culture sees history as a forward movement wherein man exists more 
in time than space; he is moving towards a goal rather than searching 
for a return to the original order. Because of this there grows a 
particular understanding of human autonomy and freedom. Social chaos 
and the existential enigmas became problems to be solved through the 
exercise of human activity which in turn causes meaning to exist in 
patterns of development in time. Happiness, meaning and social control 
is found in the need to face the present and solve present problems 
in utopic language and terms. Therefore, the myths (cultural stories) 
created by a techno-culture must refer to this meaning process. And 
so, a foundation for technological myths is in a liberal view of 
history and technology. Western technological culture expresses this 
spirit in its radical commitment to a certain pioneer spirit of hard 
work and planning, while Eastern technological culture develops a 
radical commitment to a Marxist vision. Somehow the language and 
symbols of a technological age begin to centre around a cosmic 
evolutionary meaning process and a Marxist materialistic dialectics. 
Cultural meaning goes through a change in its myths when the under-
lying spirit of social praxis is turned into a sociological vision 
which is to come about through a scientific vision and technique. 
Scientific consciousness from its founding in writers such as Comte, 
Marx, Durkheim, etc. offers a radically different type of horizon. 
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It is this sociological vision which is supported when Darwin intro-
duces his Origin of Species. From there it leaps out of its 
scientific biological foundation to become part of a new cultural 
i 
meaning-making process. From this point it is only a matter of time 
until levels of symbolism that deal with social meaning, control and 
chaos are evolutionary in nature. Early scientific views of nature 
and man, a linear concept of history along with a total acceptance of 
human autonomy as creating forces, 
are no longer part of a limited structure, but 
deal with universal structure and patterns. They 
are no longer part of an original scientific base 
in biology and economics, but provide a universal 
service as visions of the total structure of things.^ 
This spirit (history, sociological vision and autonomy) serves as an 
intelligible explanation of the evils and the enigmas of historical 
life and contains a vision of an ultimate structure, which thereby 
determines the character of social and individual events. As traditional 
myths did they relate our values and our hopes to the objective nature 
of things. The change of cultural meaning is most apparently seen in 
language. Where symbolic ethical imperatives are no longer terms of 
ought to be, as much as terms of what will be, language becomes indica-
tive and assertive. The cultural spirit then creates a new set of 
determinants for contemporary models and norms, for individual human 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities 
of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of 
Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 296-300. 
2Ibid., p. 295. 
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existence, for socio and political decisions, patterns of education 
and life style. 
This particular techno-spirit must produce myths (cultural 
stories) that will support its intentions. In order to do this these 
myths build upon either of two particular attitudes: one, that laws 
of mechanical efficiency will bring about the social vision; two, 
that social praxis is brought about with a complete faith in human 
autonomy. Langdon Gilkey, therefore, categorizes techno-myths as 
being either Mechanomorphic or Anthropomorphic. 
Mechanomorphic Myth 
Mechanical myths are those myths that offer a solution for social 
chaos on the basis of objective scientific laws. All problems have a 
solution depending on the discovery of certain scientific laws that 
serve as constants. The myth comes under the guise of science, i.e., 
the myths are seen as true statements verifiable or falsifiable by 
the experience of the community of science. A Marxist vision is guarded 
by certain economic laws and a sociology of a class power structure. 
If these economic and sociological laws are followed society will solve 
its problems and the enigmas of life; people will become free in their 
obedience to the ideology, which becomes awe-inspiring or sacred. It 
is an awe-inspiring manifesto demanding intellectual and ethical 
obedience. Western techno-society expresses the mechanical myth in 
quite a different form. The scientific vision boasts of the same 
problem solving ability, only in a Western culture it is laws of free 
enterprise and a work ethic that promise mastery over the enigmas of 
62 
life. Freedom is to become committed to economic, psychological and 
sociological laws. 
Mechanomorphic myths differ from traditional religious myths 
in their claim not to have any hidden mysterious power. They are 
not revelations, but are generalizations and statistics that can be 
observed by anyone who may validate them through objective inquiry. 
Just as all myths must have ritual to solidify them within the 
cultural process, mechanomorphic myths are reinforced by secular 
rituals such as sporting events, stressing the virtues of discipline 
and competition. It is the Sunday afternoon football game, for 
example, that highlights how one is to order his personalities. 
Players become prototypes of a cult of rugged individualism. And 
the scientist in the white jacket with his scientific instruments 
becomes a shaman figure, for it is the man with scientific language 
and skills that can really solve the problems given enough time. When 
dialectical materialism and a liberal evolutionary view jump from their 
scientific base to give a total explanation of cultural purpose they 
must then be interpreted as myths, and in doing this run the risk of 
becoming ridiculous. Because their symbols are not nearly analogous 
enough, they can offer only a one dimensional sequential concept of 
man and cannot represent the several realities of human existence or 
social chaos. It is for this reason that contemporary society is 
entering a period of cultural revolution. The mechanical myths have 
ceased to have the power to give adequate cultural meaning. 
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Besides a lack of symbolic value the mechanomorphic myth tends 
to destroy a spirit of human drama. At least in old classical 
mythology there was a drama of encounter with a divine will. Although 
the divine will was a mythical proclamation of necessity and order 
life was seen as a process of contingency and accident. Science 
forces reality into a necessary process of finding the laws and 
variables to automatically control human conduct. When this happens 
the drama of man's free participation becomes unintelligible and 
precarious. Although there is evidence that mechanomorphic myths are 
still part of the contemporary cultural process, there are several 
signs that they are losing ground, and new myths are developing. 
With the holocaust of World War II contemporary man began to 
realize the great danger to a mechanomorphic consciousness. For in 
so many ways it was the Nazi myth that appealed to the mechanical 
aggressiveness of man. But this myth was made up of ingredients that 
came from a Hegelian philosophy (linear history) and the ideology of 
a master race developed along "so called" genetic principles. During 
the war and with its conclusion an existential spirit came into exist-
ence, a spirit fundamentally distrustful of mechanical concepts of man 
and the myths it produces. The existential spirit stressed once again 
the drama of the human will. It differs from classical mythology in 
that within human autonomy itself the absolute is found. Even though 
the mechanomorphic myths for the greater part are breaking down the 
cultural spirit of linear history, human autonomy and social praxis 
continues. Which means the mechanomorphic myths will be replaced by 
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new myths, but these myths will remain within the process of the 
contemporary-techno cultural spirit. 
Myths of Human Autonomy 
A technological culture must then radically turn to the human 
spirit, to have a sense of the sacred, so it makes human freedom the 
sacred, that which is awe-inspiring. Fortunately, myths of human 
freedom have a great advantage over mechanomorphic myths, since their 
language is much more analogous to life. Human autonomy myths have 
a richer multivalent symbolic language; they are more capable of 
embracing all of reality, its ambiguities and enigmas. These myths 
are anthropormorphic since they are man centred, and it is in 
transcending encapsulated empirical discourse that contemporary culture 
looks for a deeper awareness of the sacred and ultimate meaning. 
Already, there is interesting data being collected that 
substantiates the observation that new myths are being created to 
explain the social chaos and enigmas of life. A familiarity with 
contemporary literature, songs or drama clearly indicates that it is 
the free man who is the holy man, it is the uninhibited man who 
discovers the mystery of life. 
The anthropologist Ben J. Wallace conducting field work in 
northern New Mexico for Southern Methodist University has done a 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of 
Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of 
Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp, 302-312. 
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suitable ethnography on communes. His work is an ethnography of 
Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in Culture Change. Most 
important, however, is his main theory that the purpose of the counter 
culture, or as he describes it, intentional-culture, is process, the 
constant search for meaning, but a meaning always of an anthropocentric 
nature that one arrives at in a free, uninhibited, unorganized and 
non-scientific environment. Gibson Winter of the University of 
Chicago has a much broader sociological type of investigation in his 
book Being Free. In this readable book he has assembled a great 
deal of data which argues that the youth culture in America has 
2 
entered a new meaning-making process. 
Beyond my own almost daily impressions I have attempted to 
verify the theories of Wallace and Winter in two field projects; 
(a) a summer project which ran for two summers, called S.O.L.E. (Summer 
Opportunity for Learning Experience); and (b), a Dropout School, W.A.I.T. 
(Working At It Together) sponsored by the K-W Separate School Board. 
Both of these projects substantiate the arguments that meaning is being 
sought in radically new ways. One can easily read in projects of this 
type a rebellion against mechanical forms of teaching and education 
and the passing on of mechanical myths. 
Ben J. Wallace, "Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in 
Culture Change". PP- 63-64. 
2 
Gibson Winter, Being Free (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 
1970), pp. 75-143. 
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When the mythical elements of the cultural process change or 
two strong cultural stories are fighting for dominance behaviour 
changes. It would seem that the basic behavioural types coming into 
being in a contemporary process are: (i), scientific man; (ii), existential 
man; (iii), liberal and democratic citizen; (iv), new left rebel. 
Scientific man has the characteristics of the professional and academic. 
He is supposedly of critical intelligence, scientific knowledge and 
humanitarian principles. Existential man, who appears unrepressed, 
presumes himself to be free and loving of much philosophical psychology. 
The liberal and democratic citizen is well trained in formal education 
and often travels in humanist circles. Or, the New Left Rebel who 
represents autonomous anthropocentricity, sees himself as uncomprising 
and hard-headed. His theme is the need to drop out for the sake of 
authenticity and develop valid alternatives to the mainstream of techno-
culture. A fair guess is that liberal types share the anthropomorphic 
myth and conservative types the mechanomorphic myth. In chart form 
a very brief outline is suggested for the purpose of the thematic 
development of this paper. 
CHART II 
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MECHANOMORPHIC (MECHANICAL) 
-Conservative Institutional-
ist 
-of social structure 
-Militarist 
-power balance 
-war games 
-Authoritarian dogmatist 
-usually in ecclesiasti-
cal aide, but in culture 
more and more assoc. 
education 
•Ideologist 
-Marxist - party 
-capitalist - politics 
- business 
types 
-Scientist 
-schools of behaviourism 
and determinism 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC (HUMAN AUTONOMY) 
-Scientific man 
-new type - existential 
-Existential man 
-radical concept of 
freedom 
-Liberal and democratic man 
-crosses all classes 
-predominantly middle class 
-sometimes known as bank-
rupt liberal 
-New left radical 
-youth 
-radical alternatives 
Both of these two types share in common the belief that to be 
able to understand, to know about or to be aware of something is to 
be able to control and direct it. Knowledge and an awareness which 
traditionally has also served as a blindly determining force in man 
and most often given to evil, now become a new humanizing instrument 
of man. Realization of human freedom now promises freedom from evil 
rather than freedom for evil. Awareness and freedom become the social 
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praxis, the means of solving the social chaos. 
Before beginning the section of theological reflection on 
the nature of freedom a brief summary is necessary. 
(a) Neo-behaviourism of the Skinnerian type has been structured 
within the limits of stimuli-response theory, and this he has applied 
to cultural design. 
(b) It is argued that stimuli-response theories are significant 
scientific statements but to have valid statements about behaviour and 
freedom all statements must be placed in a larger whole -- the whole 
process of culture and meaning-making. 
(c) Behaviour must also be considered in terms of meaning, and 
the understanding of behaviour means an interaction of all forms of 
symbolic formation. 
(d) Meaning is a human drive --to understand the elements of 
this drive demands recourse to underlying forms of consciousness. 
Therefore, the whole domain of the subconscious remains valid even in 
light of behaviourist findings. It is my personal belief that the 
study of the subconscious is more applicable to social problem solving 
if it is done in terms of the will to power, and how this expresses 
itself in symbolic forms of behaviour. 
(e) A new clue to human nature offers a pivotal point for this 
process system. It is the symbolic seen as behaviourial input-output. 
(f) Accepting the interaction that takes place in man's 
cognitive acts is where a theological system begins to defend freedom. 
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As Wallace quotes one of the young people in the commune he studied, 
"We are a process of becoming, fitting together and falling apart. 
It changes and we change and it changes..." 
THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM AND THE PROCESS OF BECOMING - V 
A Dynamic Flow in Time and Space 
I have selected the terminology, theological freedom, not 
because other ways of describing the reality of freedom are unavailable, 
but because it is a form of symbolism that contains expressions of 
ultimacy. For it is the function of theology to discover and organize 
symbols that represent the human desire for ultimate meaning. So 
when I speak theologically I am stating that I wish to believe always 
in freedom and my wishes have concrete validity when the cultural 
2 
process is understood. Yet, I want to express it in language that 
exists outside of myself and this I can do when I opt for theological 
expressions, since it is a means of expressing an inner flow of ultimacy 
and feeling to others. Wishful thinking, then, turns into a theological 
expression of hope and possibility. Theology serves to express deep 
3 
human wishes and ultimate drives. Thus, theology in terms of what has 
Ben J. Wallace, "Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in 
Culture Change", p. 69. 
'mchael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 85-86. 
Ibid., pp. 11-24. 
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been said about the cultural process is a special type of meaning-
making within the whole. Basically, its method is to understand the 
elements of story-making and relate this to deeper questions. In 
order to arrive at this type of meaning theology uses its own form 
of symbolism. The continual question of importance for theology is, 
does its symbols explain and give meaning to the cognitive flow of the 
cultural process? I argue that on the basis of recent theological 
development its symbols do. 
In the contemporary period theology has entered three distinct 
phases -- liberalism, neo-orthodox, and radical theology -- each 
school attempting to formulate meaningful theological discourse. 
Liberalism is a school of thought that creates its theological discourse 
from a commitment to a human quest. In the symbolic forms of culture 
itself it discovers strong and natural grounds for theology. Much of 
its exploration and dialogue are usually in the area of science and 
the evolutionary scientific view of society. Neo-Orthodox is a 
reaction to the liberal efforts, holding that in the liberal movements 
there is a negation of basic theological symbols. Neo-Orthodoxy in 
its reaction is an effort to retrieve fundamental theological symbols 
that proclaim the inadequacy of the human evolutionary vision. Further-
more, this retrieve is necessary, neo-orthodoxy claims, because 
theology cannot express the true nature of the Holy other than in 
Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 53-67. 
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purely human terms. Radical theology is a much different endeavour, 
and becomes known as the "God is dead" movement. The movement 
realizes the needs for religious and theological symbols, but differs 
from liberalism and neo-orthodoxy in that it sees these symbols only 
in terms of poetic imagery through which man professes his desire to 
become human. Religion is the process of man humanizing himself. 
There is perhaps another approach to theology other than the 
above mentioned three, and this resembles the cultural process. It is 
that theological school which fully accepts culture and society as a 
process, a process of discovering insights and horizons. Process 
theology is the methodology upon which this paper has been developing. 
As a theological system it has great respect for the three above 
mentioned approaches, namely liberalism, neo-orthodoxy and radical 
theology. It reacts, however, when schools of thought become 
encapsulated systems. It is true that theological discourse may very 
well need certain basic symbols, even radical theologians must accept 
these symbols if they are to create any type of theological discourse. 
It is likewise true that theology must have an understanding of the 
natural meaning-making process of man. The important thing to realize 
is that both symbolism and theological discourse are always in a 
temporal-formal relationship, meaning that the theological symbols, 
Langdon Gilkey, Naming The Whirlwind, The Renewal of God-
Language (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), 
pp. 31-145. 
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even if traditional symbols, are relative to the time-space continuum 
in which theological thought is pursued. Thus, theology is necessarily 
seen as a particular discourse at a particular time, leaving the 
theologian the task of forming language and understanding symbols, 
simultaneous to his awareness of the dynmaics of culture. Of course, 
it is never really possible to fully know the present process. The 
necessary point is that the effort is being made to know how one knows 
and is motivated, and then to task speculative and ethical questions. 
Such a theological process is begun when religion is first of 
all willing to objectify its own myths (cultural stories). Admitting 
that man is mythical and lives on stories makes theology, as Bultmann 
suggested, a demythologizing enterprise. But Bultmann failed in his 
school of thought when he refused to appreciate the fact of myths being 
necessary elements in culture that serve as existential ciphers. 
Bultmann was correct in defining theology as a demythologizing activity 
within culture, yet theology cannot escape the fact that any culture 
must also remythologize, for the cultural story is essential to maintain-
ing the societal interaction. Theology, must, therefore, maintain its 
purpose in the cultural whole by pointing out that secular existence, 
despite its heated denials, raises ultimate questions for which myth 
and symbolic language provide the only mode of conceptualization. 
Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 182-183. 
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Moreover, mythical discourse is relevant to the life of secular culture, 
as evidenced by the significant re-appearance of myths born out of 
this culture. However, secular myths are seen by theology as 
suffering from the inability of the secular mind to think symbolically 
and so are unable to comprehend the enigmas as well as the blessings 
of life.1 
Bringing human awareness to deeper insights is the theological 
contribution to the cognition that happens in a culture. This demands 
two categories, the epistemological and the ethical. When this happens 
a brighter light is always shed on the question of being and becoming. 
Bernard Lonergan engages upon such an enterprise in his system of 
critical realism. In his system philosophical-theological discourse 
is one of possibility, e.g., the possibility of being, and the 
2 
possibility of good. As the theologian of culture, Tillich, argues 
that the dynamics of culture lead to ultimacy and a sense of the 
unconditional. Depth and ultimacy or critical realist theology allows 
each generation through its cultural process to recreate religious 
3 
symbols. Or, as Novak in Ascent of the Mountain and Flight of the 
Dove argues, it is the continual awareness of our ultimate drives 
Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of 
Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of 
Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), p. 298. 
2 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1951), pp. 595-633. 
Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 22-30. 
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that gives cause for new horizons in reflection and in facing the 
drive for meaning. 
With Novak I agree that theology centres around the fundamental 
question of whether one exists in a surface or depth culture. Theology, 
in order to have purpose, must delve into all the complexities and 
ambiguities of reality. In the dynamics of culture theology discovers 
its material. From the language gained in this process, theology in 
secular language, speaks of the possibility of that which is wholly 
other. Reminding culture it never possesses absolutes as much as it is 
in a continual process of inquiry. Often this will give to theology 
a position of conflict within society --it will have to deny what it 
takes to be false ultimates. The religious man in contemporary process 
thinking is the one who is willing to travel from insight to insight 
and here is the beginning of freedom, as theology must interpret it. 
Freedom comes with the theological horizons that give a deeper view 
of the whole process that man is part of in his temporal-formal relation-
ship with history. Rather than calling it process, Lonergan refers to 
it as critical realism. A system whereby religion criticizes the whole 
2 
or knows the whole in order to prevent any part from becoming dominant. 
Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove, 
(New York: Harper § Row, 1971), pp. 89-109. 
Bernard Lonergan, Collections,,)papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. 
edited by F.F. Crowe, S.J. (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), pp. 221-239. 
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Just as there are certain theologians concerned with the nature 
of religious revelation, so there are the ethicists who must work out 
of a process vision, the method by which man gives meaning to history. 
Process ethics stands on the premise that if man is free to give meaning, 
then he is free to change meaning. Here is where the ethicist disagrees 
with the determinist and behaviourist. He does not view time and 
space as being determined by variable and invariable laws, rather it is 
determined by the quest for meaning, the drive of culture for stories 
(myths). Cassirer in "The Myth of the State" clearly traces how what 
is taken as objective political science is really the result of several 
decades of cultural stories. For example, the scientific myth of the 
artistocracy (the power elite) as destroyed by the French revolution, 
as all myths are vulnerable to being destroyed by revolutions. It is 
true myths are never created independent of determinants such as the 
socio-economic or subconscious drives, etc., and they are taught through 
enculturation and acculturation. But they are finally stories, story 
learning, and just as stories are formulated and accepted in groups, 
the ethicist argues they can be unformulated and rejected, a process 
that must exist with some type of ethical discourse. The determinants, 
the scientific laws and the variables are only a part of the story. 
It is in knowing the story that one discovers the freedom to change 
Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Foreward by Charles 
Hendel (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 231-247. 
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the story. Freedom on a wide societal scale is when a culture begins 
to de-mythologize in order to re-mythologize. In this process the 
ethicist looks for a set of questions that will guarantee the greatest 
amount of humanization and justice to take place within the parameters 
of the myth. On a daily concrete level of existence theology and 
ethics teaches man the need to objectify, place outside of himself, 
his experiences, and teach the techniques for entering the subjective-
objective process. 
This freedom process begins when man is willing to discover 
within himself a state of restlessness. The ethical imperative in 
process learning is "our hearts are restless, until they rest in thine". 
A serious confrontation with human restlessness and anguish is the 
foundation of freedom. Social ethics is a large scale acceptance of 
restlessness, which turns that restlessness into a balanced, just and 
possible revolution. Political and cultural revolution establishes 
man's ability to transcend and transform history. Animals adapt to 
their environment, they function on stimuli. Man liberates his 
2 
environment, he thematizes because he lives on symbols. Revolution 
comes from restlessness turned into themes that become the social praxis. 
These themes come with the discovery of a Void that exists within 
Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove 
(New York: Harper $ Row, 1971), pp. 153-157. 
2 
Paul Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), pp. 119-120. 
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human existence. Language, myth and ideologies are of their nature 
incomplete and when they exist for long enough begin to fail in 
i 
answering questions of ultimacy and depth. 
Aware of the void, individuals must make a decision at this 
point, although it is not really a decision. Responding to the void 
may cause an uncontrollable neurotic or psychotic rebellion or the 
decision may be to discover ethical freedom. Escaping the void in 
terms of a praxis that changes the culture and oneself is the theological 
process. Of course, the culture will react against the outsider sensing 
the void, and here the outsider must ask himself if he cooperates with 
the culture, modifies the culture, dies in bitterness, or engages upon 
some revolutionary vision. Freedom is liberation when the void is 
discovered within the cultural flow and causes plans for action. 
Freedom is never a pure subjective cause and effect analysis for this 
is only perception. Neither is it objective understanding or revolution-
ary bitterness, for encapsulated bitterness is no more than existential 
nausea and bespeaks a consciousness that inversely enjoys obstacles 
2 
and deprivation. 
Because freedom is a flow man becomes most authentic when he 
is in a subjective-objective flow of understanding. The individual, 
Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind, The Renewal of God-
Language (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company7~1969), 
pp. 330-332. 
2 
Paul Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), pp. 75-119. 
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the "I", is minding, feeling and hoping in order to find horizons for 
purposes of experience and justice. Man is free when he hears this 
sensitivity within himself. It is an existential call to search for 
this flow in others (objectifying) and with others, and there with 
organize theories for action. Because there exists within every man 
some longing for growth (alteration) ethics believes in freedom. Yet, 
ethics insist that achieved freedom demands communication and 
transcendence so that man can transform reality from an ethical distance. 
We might call this ethical initiative. 
I shall summarize the ethical flow in chart form, but before 
doing this I once again remind the reader of my approach to culture, 
an approach I believe is necessary if there is to develop any creative 
social praxis. A culture is a group or groups where one acquires 
learned behaviour. Early learning enculturation and its following 
forms come about through acculturation. This acquiring process through 
groups is in contemporary society a most complex process. From this 
process one gains stories, attitudes and mores. One's culture is the 
basic group and the variety of groups the individual encounters in 
their time-space travel through life. At this point the subjective-
objective categories can be transcended and the process is described 
in monograph-autobiography terms. See Chart III (Appendix I). 
CHART III Examines Auto-Biography Examines 
Identity 
(Inte-
gration) 
Growth 
(Altera-
tion) 
Sense of 
Personal 
Anguish 
Sense of 
Cultural 
Anguish 
Personal Identity 
in Decision-
Making 
a)Sense of 
Personal Rest-
lessness 
b)Sense of 
Personal 
Experimentation 
c)Sense of 
Personal Life 
as a Dialogical 
Process 
Group Identity 
in Decision 
Making 
a)Sense of Group 
Restlessness 
b)Sense of Group 
Experimentation 
c)Sense of Group 
Life as a 
Dialogical 
Process 
Resolu-
tion of 
Personal 
Anguish 
Resolu-
tion of 
Cultural 
Anguish 
I 
Research Monograph Discovers Community 
Participation 
Personal Grounds 
for Valuing 
Action 
a)Questioning of 
Personal Rest-
lessness 
b)Questioning of 
Personal 
Experimentation 
c)Questioning of 
Personal Life as 
a Dialogical 
Process 
Social Grounds 
for Valuing 
Action 
a)Questioning of 
Group Restless-
ness 
b)Questioning of 
Group Experi-
mentation 
c)Questioning of 
Group Life as 
a Dialogical 
Process 
Application 
of 
Personal 
Anguish 
Application 
of 
Cultural 
Anguish 
Forces for/against 
Moral Sensitivity 
a)Encountering 
Personal forces 
of Restlessness 
b)Encountering 
Personal forces 
of Experimenta-
tion 
b)Encountering 
Personal forces 
of Life as a 
Dialogical Pro-
cess 
Forces for/against 
Social Justice 
a)Encountering 
group forces of 
Restlessness 
b)Encountering 
group forces of 
Experimentation 
c)Encountering 
group forces of 
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I have been describing theological freedom in theory and 
concrete practice, since a flow of reality resists any state definition. 
This method preserves freedom, hopefully, in terms significant to 
those cultural settings wherein freedom is being associated with highly 
hypnotic devices used to condition behaviour. 
Freedom, it is suggested, exists in the following thematics: 
(a) A drive for meaning that happens strongly in some, potentially 
in all. 
(b) Its appearance guarantees the promise of new horizons. 
(c) Horizons come about from the Void existing in culture, a 
void answering only in terms of ultimacy and depth. 
(d) Societal freedom is the mutual sharing, organizing and justifying 
of these horizons. 
CONCLUSIONS: A RETURN TO SKINNER - VI 
Originally, the problem of freedom was restricted in the first 
part of this paper in order to have a centre from which to begin. I 
now return to that point to make final conclusions from the theories 
put forth on freedom and culture. 
First of all, it seems to me that Skinner represents a serious 
type of epistemological encapsulation. Many of his statements are most 
important for the understanding of behaviour, but to turn them into an 
ideology is dangerous. Process ethics would interpret such an encapsula-
tion as de-humanizing. I believe that Skinner does this because in his 
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attempt to describe the dynamics of culture he, at the expense of the 
richness of those dynamics, forces all of societal and cultural change 
into the limited symbolism of S-R theories. In point of fact Skinner 
is heavily indoctrinated with the mechanomorphic myth. Skinner feels a 
breakdown is taking place in contemporary society with the lack of 
appreciation for mechanistic views, and he responds by returning to the 
peak of his acculturation -- mechanomorphic conditioning. As a powerful 
individual who is deeply enmeshed in this myth he hakes on an evangelistic 
mission, preaching the dogma of mechanistic technique to solve the 
engimas of life. In this way he becomes a high-priest, who knows the 
true mysteries of human behaviour. As the story of man-centered 
autonomy grows, Skinner like many others recognizes the weaknesses in 
this story and reacts with a total proclamation from his process. 
Because of this he does not face the limited symbolic value of 
mechanical myths and ignores the demands within the process of culture 
for ultimacy and depth. For Skinner, ultimate reality becomes the 
Utopia of Walden II, and therewith succumbs to the danger of any Utopian 
who believes the dimensions of time and space are solved when the new 
Utopia arrives. The limitation of such a stance is made manifest in the 
affirmation that planning and laws will solve the problem of evil. 
There are great signs of hope to be found by combining the ethical press 
for the good and scientific technique. However, these signs of hope ought 
not obscure the seriousness of the question of evil. There are 
several ways of speaking to this problem and my preference is in the 
will to power. Evil expresses itself in the drive for dominance and 
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control. In straight animal studies this is clearly demonstrated on 
the level of empirical perception. It becomes especially obvious 
in that as soon as a small group (five or six) becomes large power 
structures automatically develop. At present, Dr. Thomas MacFeat 
from the University of Toronto, School of Anthropology, is researching 
the inter-dynamics of small group behaviour and political structures. 
Power and the thirst for it is a reality ethics must take seriously. 
Skinner, too, easily solves the problem in Walden II: it all depends 
on early conditioning. Therefore, it must be asked, is there any 
guarantee that even with well conditioned people who live in a protected 
culture that the will to become dominant will disappear? As Tillich 
once pointed out, if the controller is free to control, it must also be 
presumed that the one being controlled has at least the equal freedom 
to control. 
I would suggest that this longing for power will eventually 
occur in any culture, and the only check on it is the ethical awareness 
that the controlled longs to be the controller. A power theory can 
find a great amount of support in socio-linguistic theories because it 
is not beyond analysis to see information as a source of power. Informa-
tion is received by groups that have access to various symbols or 
individuals exercising a certain mobility within culture. Skinner 
mentions in his design of culture that the operation will be controlled 
by well balanced, freely elected technicians of human behaviour. What 
he overlooks is the acquisition of information to control culture leads 
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to the gaining of power.* Are we really to believe that even 
technicians with excellent control of their emotions will not be tempted 
to rule with their acquisition of information. 
These insights concerning information and power become especially 
significant in light of the apparent over-riding temptation of 
behaviourists to exercise their power on the basis of their information. 
In theology, dogmatists are similarly susceptible to this ethical 
temptation. In both cases the temptation is facilitated by the attempt 
to employ limited bodies of information for the exhausting explanation 
of reality. To do this is to improperly use the part to explain the 
whole. In the process of culture, development thi£ leads to an overnx 
centralization of power. Skinner claims that his theories destroy the 
powersyndrome, but this claim is belied by his development of a system 
of cultural design which places strong emphasis on the gathering of more 
and more information. Jacques Ellul in his Treatment of Technological 
Society has clearly shown how power and information are tied together. 
And it is just this danger which is one of our major ethical questions, 
can we handle the power that comes with knowledge. 
Ethicists such as Paul Friere, Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man and 
Immoral Society), Paul Tillich (Love, Power and Justice) build much of 
their ethical system on man's drive for power. However, it is not 
only a systematic ethical principle, it is a social process easily 
recognized and scientifically studied and predicted in a process system 
that studies human behaviour. I would agree that power is treated in 
ethics with the same interest as the physical sciences treat energy, 
i.e., in terms of its components. 
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Sensitive to the unanswered questions of the anthropocentric 
myths Skinner exercises his ethical concerns and denies these con-
temporary myths. Becoming thus a prophet he challenges contemporary 
society with his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In point of fact 
what he has done is de-mythologize present culture. Unfortunately, his 
challenge is not prophetic enough. It is not founded on ultimacy and 
depth, but rather returns to his earlier group behaviour, and the past 
work of Thorndike and Watson. Not unfairly Skinner's challenge to the 
science of behaviour, could be parralleled to the challenge placed on 
Orthodox theology. It may be no accident that Skinner's work has been 
called neo-behaviourism. 
Skinner's work on conditioning is extremely important since it 
sheds a great deal of light on how behaviour is acquired and supported 
through contingencies and reinforcement in the cultural process. The 
empirical work on motivation towards positive reinforcement is invaluable 
to ethical constructs, but encapsulation will destroy it. Skinner becomes 
a type of behaviourist mystic. There is an all holy power to S-R 
theories, it is a solution to everything. For in the little box (Skinner 
box) all mystery is revealed. When reading Walden II one often gets the 
impression that what is being described is in one sense an advanced 
primitive religion. 
It has not been my intention to do polemics with Skinner for 
the purpose of denying behaviourism as a school of thought. Rather I 
suggest that behaviourism is valid if it means certain things, but invalid 
if it stands for certain erroneous principles. Obviously the erroneous 
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principles are the denial of freedom and dignity and the radical 
scientific emphasis on outer space or the total passivity of man. 
Behaviourism, however, is most deserving of attention if it puts forth 
its principles in other ways. If it argues that to know behaviour we 
need a wider base, e.g., wider than Freudian principles of inner 
consciousness, then I agree. A science of human behaviour must have a 
base that allows for the overlap of perception and investigation of 
several systems. When this base and fundamental axiom is established 
a system of behaviour grows that can analyze in terms of a behavioural 
theology. The building of this base must be based on the dynamics of 
symbolism, the quest for meaning and symbols of the unconscious, and 
the recognition that behaviour is always operant within a culture. 
Behaviour is a question of culture, human behaviour outside of a culture 
has never existed, and cannot exist. All scientific or theological 
investigation which ignores this is doomed to encapsulation. Furthermore, 
when one defines behaviour as an independent entity abstracted from a 
culture, findings will have little application in the real world of 
dynamic culture. Freedom is an underlying sensitive flow of questions 
and rebellious actions. It is the task of theology to respond to these 
questions, and ensure that rebellious action is of the most human type. 
A type which also faces the deeper ethical questions of strategy. Even 
conditioned people possess an underlying sensitive flow that promises 
either growth towards the good or resignation to evil!! 
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APPENDIX II 
BEHAVIOURAL CULTURAL STRUCTURE: Culture as a source of meaning and motivation 
ETHICAL FREEDOM BASED ON 
Awareness and decision 
making- -nonexistent 
Primarily adapts to culture 
as opposed to design of 
culture 
Process of 
Interiority 
^INDIVIDUALISM 
ETHICAL FREEDOM«HUMAN ACTS 
Aware of 
sensitive 
under-
lying 
flow 
REFLEXIVE 
ACTION 
/""Cause for questions 
I Re: ultimacy and 
I depth 
l Cause for 
1 alternate 
V^  action 
(Ethical Design of Culture 
SOCIETAL GOOD 
KEY 
B = Behaviour (Human) 
B = Behaviour (Animal) 
C = Components (General) 
S-R= Stimulus-Response 
R-E= Symbolic-Receptor 
-Effector System 
unconscious 
symbols 
D = Drives power 
needs 
S-M = Myth (Story Making) 
GR = influence of group culture in 
formation of behaviour 
overlap = Reciprocal interaction 
A = Awareness I n s i § h t 
A Awareness
 R e s t l e s s n e s s 
U.I. = Unconscious Imprint 
L = Language Codified 
M = Quest for meaning 
* = Process predominance in 
development of behaviour 
* = less 
** = quite 
*** = strongly 
**** = extremely 
*--question of dominant behaviour 
factor may vary tremendously 
given individual cases 
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APPENDIX III 
Suggestions for Further Reading 
Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy 
of Human Culture. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1944. 
In many ways Cassirer balances Lonergan. One of the 
limitations (if that is a proper choice of words) to 
Lonergan is that he stresses interiority so much that 
he is inclined to overlook empirical positivistic questions. 
Cassirer offers a much more positivistic treatment of 
culture and knowing. 
Friere, Paul. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder, 
1972. 
Chapter 3 gives a full treatment of ethics and radical 
humanistic dialectics. 
Gilkey, Langdon. "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-
Century Theology", a paper delivered at University of Toronto 
Theology Conference,'. 1967. 
Included in: 
Shook, C. (ed.) Theological Renewal. C.S.P. Montreal: Palm 
Publishers, 1967. 
Because of this paper I could develop my fourth factor 
in a behavioral theological sketch, namely S-M--Storymaking. 
Unfortunately, Gilkey has never expanded this particular 
paper into a major work. I used his material in my thesis 
but in manner somewhat different than Gilkey's theological 
method. Gilkey is really an historian, however, he has a great 
talent for summarizing large scale cultural insights. What I 
have done is to place his research into an empirical construct. 
Of all my sources I remain most indebted to this work, it was 
the key. 
Hartshome, Charles. Reality as Social Process, Studies in Metaphysics 
and Religion. Foreword by William Ernest Hocking. New York: 
Hofner Publishing Company, 1953. 
Again Hartshome, an empirical philosopher-theologian, provided 
a process metaphysical vision. It is a theological analysis 
that draws from reality with a categorical scientific awareness. 
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His analysis allows one to overcome dualistic concepts 
as applied to the knowing of behaviour, and he also 
would defend freedom on the Lonergan and Whiteheadian 
principle of "sensitive underlying flow". Note: Chapters 
3 and 4 "Elements of Truth in the Group-Mind Concept": 
synthesis of Idealism and Realism. 
Hesse, Herman. Magister Ludi or The Glass Bead Game. Foreword 
by Theodore Zidkowski. Translated by Richard and Clara 
Winston, New York: Bantam Books, 1947. 
Beyond a doubt Hesse's most difficult and metaphysical 
work. In my study of Hesse, especially this book I discovered 
the same questions of interiority and cognition that Lonergan 
treats. Hesse is especially helpful in pointing out how the 
same questions exist in the eastern mind. 
Lonergan, Bernard. Insight. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 
The whole method of my behavioural study is based on 
the technique of Lonergan. It is a combination of empiricism 
and quest for interiority (highly structured phenomendlogy); 
from the problems of interiority (inner consciousness) and 
the method of scientific consciousness Lonergan offers a new 
sense of insight, and a concept of mystery founded on complexity 
and ambiguity. 
Novak, Michael. Ascent of the Mountain. Flight of the Dove. New York: 
Harper § Row, 1971. 
A work helpful in its simplication and application of 
Lonergan's Insight. The major contribution of Ascent was 
the ethical analysis of surface-depth culture. 
Royce, R. Joseph. The Encapsulated Man. New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., 1964. 
Royce was extremely helpful as an empiricist (psychologist) 
who has seriously considered Tillich's theological principle 
of ultimate concern and meaning. As an empiricist Royce 
breaks this principle down into its cultural modes of perception, 
and substantiates his argumentation from Gestalt psychology. 
Spradley, James and David W. McCurdy. The Cultural Experience, 
Ethnography in Complex Society. Chicago: Science Research 
Association Inc., 1972. 
Ethnographic technique was drawn from this work. The final 
key chart finds its theoretical base in chapter 4 "Cultural 
Meaning". Much of Spradley's ethnographic technique, however, 
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was adjusted, since Spradley is of the linguistic 
analysis school. Nevertheless, his concepts on graphs 
and data collection do apply to a behavioural study. 
Tillich, Paul. Theology of Culture. Edited by Robert C. Kimball, 
New York! Oxford University Press, 1959. 
It is only because of this book that one even dares to 
explore the topic of theological anthropology. My method 
differs from Tillich in that it emphasizes empirical 
technique, but is not opposed to the ecstasy concept of 
Tillich (Morality and Beyond). 
White, Leslie A. The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and 
Civilization! New York: Grove Press Inc., 1949. 
His study of symbols as organized determinants was used 
extensively: note chapters 2 and 12. Although my final 
chart illustrates that I work out of a process model as 
opposed to determinist's models and paradigms. 
Winter, Gibson. "Human Science and Ethics in a Creative Society", 
delivered at the American Society of Christian Ethics, 
Los Angeles, 1971. 
This paper is one of the most important works to have 
appeared in the field of ethics in recent times. It 
presents ethics in a techno-society as an exercise in 
asking fundamental questions. Doing this ethics then 
offers its unique contribution to societal change, and 
argues that change is ethical when social science and 
society (i) regains a Sociological Vision (ii) a centrality 
of praxis (iii) a retrieve of symbolism. 
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